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Abstract
A History of Violence: British Colonial Policing in Ireland and the Palestine Mandate
Tyler Krahe
British colonial policing dramatically evolved between 1920 and 1948. This time period
represents the duration of the Anglo-Irish War, as well as British control of the Palestine
Mandate. It was during the period that the security forces at work within these areas grew to
combat similar nationalist populations. During the Anglo-Irish War in 1919 the security forces in
Ireland found themselves unable to quell the rebellion of Irish nationalists. To supplement their
inadequate numbers the Royal Irish Constabulary took on and trained large numbers of World
War I veterans who were in desperate need of work. These men came to be known as the
infamous 'Black and Tans'. They quickly earned a reputation for using violent tactics when
dealing with the Irish Republican Army. Following the resolution of the Anglo-Irish War, many
of these men were left with few employment options until the Empire came calling again. This
time they were called upon to police the newly formed mandate in Palestine. A large portion of
the Royal Irish Constabulary, as well as the Black and Tans immediately signed up to forge the
British Gendarmerie in Palestine. This unit helped to keep the peace during years of heavy
Jewish immigration into the Holy Land until 1926 when it was absorbed into the Palestine
Police. Many of the same men who had started their career in Ireland continued into the
Gendarmerie and further into the Palestine Police until the Mandate ended in 1948. During the
1930s and 1940s the Palestine Police at first were able to effectively police the population of the
Mandate, but ultimately were unsuccessful in combating the forces of Jewish nationalism and
Jewish terrorism. This study is supported by primary sources including administrative reports,
commissions, personal diaries, personal correspondence, oral histories and memoirs. Further, it
consults a wide range of secondary literature.
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Introduction
In the twentieth century the manner in which the British Empire was policed inherently
changed. Starting with the Royal Irish Constabulary in Ireland a new, more brutal form of
paramilitary policing force emerged that stood in sharp contrast to the unarmed Metropolitan
Police in London. Officers carried weapons and took on tasks the looked increasingly like those
belonging to a military intelligence agency. The divide between traditional police and this new
species grew even more dramatically during the Anglo-Irish War of the early 1920s. Facing low
enrollment numbers, as well as an increasingly more violent nationalist enemy, the Royal Irish
Constabulary began to take on large numbers of new recruits to supplement their ranks. Many of
these men were veterans of the First World War and in search of a job. They became members of
the Auxiliary Division and the better-known, and certainly more infamous Black and Tans.
Following a brief training period that placed little emphasis on traditional police work,
the units were deemed fit for duty and posted throughout Ireland. What followed was two years
of constant violence between the security forces in Ireland and Irish nationalists. The nationalists
attacked the British forces which they considered to be an unlawful occupying force and in
return certain members of the British forces exacted violent retribution upon the nationalists.
Eventually, the British Empire was forced to cut their losses in Ireland and grant
independence. This however left a number of English and Irish police officers without a job and
especially for many of the Irish, without a safe home to which they could return. Fortunately for
these men an opportunity presented itself to continue their policing career in the newly formed
British Gendarmerie in Palestine
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The British Gendarmerie was formed in order to help police the newly formed Palestine
Mandate. As Great Britain had assumed stewardship of the Mandate, a greater security force was
needed to help control the boarders and keep the peace between the increasing number of Jewish
immigrants and the native Arab population. Many feared that with the force being comprised
almost entirely of former Black and Tan, Auxiliary, and RIC men, the brutality of their behavior
in Ireland would be exported to Palestine. This however was not the case. The British
Gendarmerie performed quite well and without serious incident. In fact the years of the British
Gendarmerie were some of the most peaceful in the Mandate. So peaceful were these years that
government spending on security was cut each successive year until in 1926 it was deemed
financially necessary to disband the Gendarmerie and incorporate it into the existing Palestine
Police, which had been in operation since 1920.
The Mandate remained relatively peaceful as the former Gendarmes were incorporated
into the force. Training and reform was already taking place in order to make them more capable
police officers skilled in detection and investigation. Despite these efforts, the force proved itself
unprepared to handle the reality of religious and nationalist fervor in Palestine. The 1929
Massacre set off a decade of turmoil in which the police would continually evolve through a
process of revolt and reform until the onset of World War Two.1 During and after the war the
force could no longer control the increasingly violent organizations of Jewish nationalism and
the British Empire was forced to release yet another one of its holdings.
It is the argument of this study that the security forces in Ireland began a trajectory of
ever-evolving police tactics that were initially designed in response to violence in Ireland and

1

The 1929 Massacre was a large scale disturbance that took place across several districts within the Palestine
Mandate.
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later transitioned into the Palestine Mandate, grew to the greatest extent during the 1930s, and
finally plateaued with the onset and aftermath of World War Two. The evolution of colonial
policing in this context takes into account two societies with extremely complex and contentious
histories. The forces of nationalism and religion were constantly at work serving to further
muddy the already murky waters of understanding. In an attempt to provide clarity this work
shall be divided into four chapters.
The first chapter will focus on Ireland alone. To understand how the Royal Irish
Constabulary created the base for a new type of colonial policing and how that idea evolved
during the Anglo-Irish War one must first consider the long and contentious history that existed
between Great Britain and Ireland. As such, this chapter begins with an account of Ireland’s
incorporation within the imperial fold during the nineteenth century, as well as the many
attempts of its people to resist that relationship. This chapter will also consider the nationalist
elements that came to prominence during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Finally,
the introduction of the Black and Tan and other Auxiliary forces during the Anglo-Irish War will
be discussed and analyzed to demonstrate the brief training men received to combat Irish
nationalists.
The second chapter traces the transition of the security forces in Ireland into the British
Gendarmerie in Palestine. As with Ireland, the Palestine Mandate has its own unique history and
relationship with Great Britain. It is necessary to understand the conditions during World War
One under which the Mandate was created and how Great Britain’s involvement served to
inflame religious and nationalist tensions in the territory. Also discussed is the state of policing
during the establishment of the Mandate prior to the arrival of the Ireland contingent. This
includes the establishment of the Palestine Police along with the expensive garrisoning of
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military troops in the region. Central to this chapter is the actual transition of the security forces
into the Gendarmerie, as well as the training and experience of the men themselves. The chapter
will conclude with an account of the Gendarmerie’s success and the terms of its disbandment.
Chapter three demonstrates the greatest period of evolution for the police between Ireland
and Palestine. The chapter begins with the new Palestine Police facing its first real test, and first
failure; the 1929 Hebron Massacre. The rest of the chapter focuses largely on the period of ‘riot
and reform’ that took place throughout the 1930s. This represents the ten years that the Palestine
Police spent dealing with riots and rebellions and also the commissions and reforms that took
place after each incident. Finally, this chapter follows the rise and fall of Arab violence, as well
as the consistent increase in Jewish violence.
The final chapter deals with the plateau in the evolution of tactics experienced by the
Palestine Police during and after the Second World War. With the rise of Jewish gangs and
terrorist organizations along with being conscripted into military service, the force was facing a
number of enemies on a number of fronts. As such this chapter focuses on the rise of violent
Jewish nationalism, the war effort, and finally the conditions under which the British Empire
exited the Palestine Mandate.
Certain themes run throughout this thesis on the evolution of colonial policing in and
between Ireland and Palestine. The first of these is the insistence of many of the police involved
that they did not wish to be treated as a military service men. Although the vast majority of the
men involved were former service men themselves, they seemed to want to make a clear
distinction between the two worlds of military service and civil police work. Also, and perhaps
most importantly is the theme of nationalism and religion. This is a work about policing and the
men who did the policing. However, the populations that these men were charged with securing
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were highly religious and had highly influential nationalist agendas. It is impossible to ignore the
influence of Catholicism and Irish nationalism in Ireland. In Palestine, it is impossible to ignore
Zionism and the Jewish desire for an official homeland. Finally, it is impossible to ignore the
influence of Islam and the rising tide of Arab nationalism that was prevalent at the time. As such
these elements will be factored into the study, but are not the primary focus. Influential figures
and ideas will be explained only as they pertain to the overall understanding of policing.
Also important to this study is an explanation of the term ‘terrorist’. In both Ireland and
Palestine there were a number of competing religious and nationalist identities. As such, the
violence perpetrated by any given party could be seen as terrorist action. For the purposes of this
study the label of ‘terrorists’ will be limited to instances where groups or organizations
intentionally target non-combatants. In Ireland and Palestine, the argument can be made that
during their respective periods of study, each was an occupied territory or a warzone. It follows
that attacks on British military or British security forces are not considered by this study to be
acts of terrorism. However, as these attacks expand to target family members and civilians the
term of ‘terrorist’ appears applicable.
Historiography
As this is a transnational study it stands at the confluence of several scholarly works. The
first of which is D.M. Leeson’s The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish
War of Independence, 1920-1921.2 In this work, Leeson attempts to give a more accurate history
of being one of the earliest and most infamous of British colonial police units. The Black and
Tans, a paramilitary police force used to help keep the peace during the Anglo-Irish War,

2

D.M. Leeson, The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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developed a reputation of drunken, bloodthirsty British lunatics. They were seen as a murderous
pack of criminals recruited from the dredges of the British penal system. Leeson uses the
evidence of extensive archival research to dispel several of these myths which surround the
Black and Tans. He is then able to recast the Black and Tans as World War One veterans,
recruited from both British and Irish heritage who, more often than not, had atrocities mistakenly
attributed to them. He adds further nuance to the situation by more accurately explaining the
complex relationship that existed between the Black and Tans and the rebellious populace they
attempted to police.
Leeson’s work is certainly the most balanced and thoroughly researched piece of
scholarship that exists on the subject of colonial policing in Ireland during the Irish War for
Independence. It avoids a bias as much as a piece of scholarship can be when considering such a
contentious topic and supplants the work of other writers such as Richard Bennett and William
Henry.3 Yet, for all that Leeson accomplished in his work, it ends with the resolution of the war
and the disbanding of the Black and Tans. This is not necessarily a shortcoming of the work, but
rather an expression of Leeson’s intended scope. By contrast of the current study seeks a refined
understanding of not only the Black and Tans, but of all security forces within Ireland and carry
it beyond the resolution of the Anglo-Irish War into Palestine.
Moving from Ireland into mandate Palestine there is another great work which has done
much to improve our understanding of the British police forces that operated between 1917 and
1948. A Job Well Done: Being a History of the Palestine Police Force 1920-1948 by Edward
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Richard Bennett, The Black and Tans, (London, Edward Hulton, 1959).; William Henry, Blood for Blood: The
Black and Tan War in Galway, (Cork: Mercer Press, 2012).
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Horne.4 Horne, a former constable of the Palestine Police Force himself, wrote a comprehensive
history of the security forces at work in Mandate Palestine. He offers names, rank structures, and
some larger events into which the police forces fit. When first published in 1982, Horne made
good use of the archival resources available at the time, as well as his personal relationships with
former Palestine Police personnel. He accomplished this in spite of the fact he had no training as
a professional historian. The benefit of Horne’s work is that the latter part of the book is both a
history and a memoir. Although written as a history, Horne was actually there for the end of the
Mandate. Further, there are a number of sources that Horne alone has had access to: personal
conversations, letters, and other correspondence with men who have long since passed.
However, Horne’s work, comprehensive as it may be, concerns itself with the security
forces of Mandate Palestine. It does not reach back to Ireland and analyze how the two situations
are bound together by the same group of men. Further, there have been a number of new sources
made available since the time of the book’s publishing, which shed new light on several different
aspects of policing in the mandate. Some scholars such as Sean William Gannon have drawn
upon some of these sources and have begun to make stronger connections between the Mandate
and Ireland, but have not been able to explore deeply the Irish aspect of the equation.
One historian who has examined the colonial policing connection between mandate
Palestine and pre-independence Ireland is Georgina Sinclair. Her book At the End of the Line:
Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-1980 investigates colonial police forces at the
end of empire and the legacy of ‘Britishness’ that lived on in former colonies.5 Sinclair analyzes

4

Edward Horne, A Job Well Done: Being a History of the Palestine Police Force 1920-1948, (Sussex: The Book
Guild: Sussex, 1982).
5
Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-1980, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2006).
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various colonial holdings of the British Empire and how they differ from Metropolitan Police.
She begins with one of the earliest and most often imitated forces in the empire, the Royal Irish
Constabulary. The RIC presented a model that was emulated in Palestine, India, and Ceylon,
with the idea of an almost paramilitary force that kept colonial order and reported back to a
central authority. The export of British policing to the Caribbean was largely unsuccessful.
Ultimately, across much of the empire, military style police forces that relied on coercion rather
than consent had been in operation for so long that switching to a more traditional style of
policing was not conducive to the local culture.
Sinclair, building on earlier works like The Colonial Police by Sir Charles Jeffries, does
an excellent job of placing the legacy of the RIC and the Palestine Police force into an ‘imperial
framework’.6 However, Sinclair’s study it is a broader, and thinner investigation. Sinclair
analyzes how the model of paramilitary policing was exported after Ireland and how it either did
or didn’t work with the London Metropolitan Police model. By choosing to analyze the effects in
a number of British colonies, Sinclair limits the detail of each individual study.
By focusing on the deeper history at play in both Ireland and Palestine this work will be
able to better understand the evolution in policing that took place between the two regions and
over the course of thirty years. All of these works are remarkable pieces of scholarship however
the scope of their investigation has either been too narrow or too broad to grasp the fascinating
history of a transnational police force growing to fight vastly different, yet eerily similar
religious and nationalist populations.

6

Charles Jefferies, The Colonial Police, (London: M. Parrish, 1952).
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Sources
The primary source of information for this work has been gathered from the Palestine
Police Collection which is housed in the Middle East Center Archive at St. Anthony’s College,
Oxford University.7 The collection includes the papers of a number of former members of the
Palestine Police. These papers cover a wide variety of items including personal letters, dairies,
daily crime reports, service registers, War Office memos, Colonial Office memos, and other
official documents. Also included in this collection are copies of the British Palestine Police
Magazine, as well as the publications of the British Palestine Police Old Comrades Association.
Both of these periodicals have served as a way for former members of the force to share stories
and stay informed on the activities of other members. Finally, there are a number of oral histories
included in the collection, which have been consulted. Central to the understanding of the Irish
portion of this study were oral histories collected by John Brewer. These oral histories were
taken by a number of RIC, Black and Tans, and Auxiliaries. Along with these oral histories,
witness statements from the Irish Bureau of Military History’s online collection have been
accessed. Personal memoirs proved to be a valuable source of information for each region and
also for providing a common thread as some individuals, for example Douglas V. Duff, served in
both Ireland and Palestine. Also helping to tie both stories together, as well as provide an official
governmental perspective are parliamentary debates from both the House of Commons and
House of Lords.8 Finally, a number of government acts, commissions and reports have been
consulted to better understand official governmental policy and chart policing regulation and
reform.

St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, Middle East Center Archive, [Hereafter (MECA)].
Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debate, (Hansard); Great Britain, House of Lords, Parliamentary
Debate, (Hansard).
7
8

10

Chapter I: Ireland
The Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921 marks the final bloody chapter in the relationship
between Great Britain and its longtime colonial holding, Ireland. More specifically it was the
culmination of decades of struggle by Irish nationalists for the right to self-government. The
demand for self-government in Ireland, or ‘Home Rule’ as it was termed, has a long and
complicated history that resulted in harsh police action.9 Following the violent end to another
attempt at Home Rule in 1916, a nationalist uprising began which lasted for several years and
necessitated the Royal Irish Constabulary to supplement its ranks with World War I veterans
from Britain.10 These men, who became known as the Black and Tans, along with the RIC and
Auxiliaries, have left an indelible mark upon Irish history. However, it is this period that
provides a foundation for the improvement of policing elsewhere in the Empire. This chapter
will first detail the formative years of the Home Rule movement in Ireland along with the
nationalist stirrings that it created. Next, the Easter Rising of 1916 will be examined to show its
contributions to the eventual ‘ambush-reprisal’ dynamic between the Irish Republican Army and
the Black and Tans. Also, the Royal Irish Constabulary will be examined to better understand the
importance and deterioration in training standards as violence increased. Instrumental in this
evaluation of Black and Tan training, ambushes, disbandment and eventual transition to the
British Gendarmerie are the personal memoirs of Douglas V. Duff.11 Duff was a British

‘Home Rule’ represents a movement to end British rule in Ireland. This movement has its origins in the early
nineteenth century and continued into the 1920s. While, breaking away from Britain to some extent was always a
goal of this movement, complete sovereignty was not. In fact, Home Rule was most often envisioned as a system
including an Irish parliament that handled domestic affairs while being subordinate to the parliament in Westminster
that handled defense and foreign relations. This paper will briefly examine how the Home Rule movement holds
different meaning for different groups as time progressed. Still, the majority of its incarnations did not emphasize
full Irish independence. See Jeremy Smith, Britain and Ireland: From Home Rule to Independence. (Harlow:
Longman, 1999).
10
The Royal Irish Constabulary or ‘RIC’ were a police force in operation in Ireland starting in the 1830s and ending
in 1922.
11
The British Gendarmerie was a police force created in 1922 to maintain order in mandate Palestine.
9
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Merchant Seaman who joined the Black and Tans, and then was recruited into the British
Gendarmerie in Palestine. As such, Duff’s accounts provide a common thread between the two
regions.12

Home Rule and the Nationalist Rising
To understand the context in which the Anglo-Irish War and the Black and Tans should
be situated, it is necessary to examine the deep-seeded tensions between Britain and Ireland that
existed throughout the history of the Irish Home Rule movement. This movement can be traced
back as far as the Act of Union in 1801.13 Seeing the need to strengthen its ties to Ireland and
protect itself from French threats, Britain abolished ‘Grattan’s Parliament’ with the passing of
the Act of Union. The ‘Grattan Parliament’ was named after Henry Grattan who only nineteen
years earlier in 1782 had helped the Parliament in Ireland achieve legislative independence. 14
After the dissolution of Grattan’s Parliament, one hundred Irish MPs along with twenty-eight
peers were absorbed into the Westminster Parliament in London.15 One major point of contention
in this merger was the long standing exclusion of Catholics from the English Parliament. While
many Catholics held seats in Grattan’s Parliament and retained the right to vote in elections after
the Act of Union, they were not permitted to hold a seat at Westminster. Attempting to change

12

Douglas V. Duff, Sword For Hire; the Saga of a Modern free-companion (London: John Murray, 1934).
Union with Ireland Act 1800 (Union with Ireland Act 1800)
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/apgb/Geo3/39-40/67/contents; For the purposes of this project, the Act of Union in
1801 was chosen as a starting point for Britain’s definitive claim over Ireland. It marks a convenient spot in history
to trace the narrative of Irish republican dissatisfaction. However the contentious nature of the Anglo-Irish
relationship can be traced far beyond 1801. To truly understand the long and complicated history, one would have to
look back to the conquest of the Romans, Queen Elizabeth I’s wars against Ireland, the Protestant ascendancy of
landed elites, and a myriad of other events. Space does not allow me to include every instance throughout history
that pushed the Irish to sue for independence lest it become a history of Anglo-Irish relations, and not a study of
Black and Tan violence.
14
R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972. (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 171.
15
Smith, Britain and Ireland,10.
13
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this, Catholic Lawyer Daniel O’Connell ran for the seat in Clare in 1828 and won. The Tory
government under the Duke of Wellington was faced with the decision to either let O’Connell
take his seat or deny him and risk an escalation of violence and opposition from O’Connell’s
Catholic Associations. Realizing the potential danger in denying O’Connell his position, and
alienating the Catholic majority in Ireland, the Tories relented and granted all Catholics
emancipation in 1829.16
With O’Connell’s election and the emancipation of the Catholics, the conversation in the
1830s and 1840s shifted from Catholic “relief” to repealing the Act of Union. It is here that we
see an important factor in the formation of republican violence, and ultimately this study; that is
the tactical divergence in how different groups in Ireland sought to break from Britain.17 Figures
such as O’Connell attempted to break free from Britain via, slower, more constitutional means.
Meanwhile, there were groups such as ‘Young Irelanders’ that had a nationalist base which grew
increasingly more violent, especially during the potato famine of 1845.18 While, both groups
sought an independent Ireland, the means by which they pursued it ran opposed to one another
throughout the struggle for Home Rule until the Easter Rising in 1916.
The more violent path to Home Rule was given new life with the late 19th century
creation of the Fenians or as they were also known, the Irish Republican Brotherhood.19 This

16

Smith, Britain and Ireland, 11-12.
See R. F Foster’s chapter, “The Mobilization of Popular Politics” in R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972
(New York: Penguin Books, 1988).
18
Young Ireland was a social movement that represented the more violent side of nationalism in the mid nineteenth
century. In 1848 John O’Mahony attempted an uprising in Tipperary to win back Ireland through violent means.
This was also during the time of the ‘Great Famine’ between 1845 and 1852 See Smith, Britain and Irealnd, 22.
19
‘Fenians’ or ‘Fenianism’ is a term that is used widely to refer to Irish republican groups of the mid to late
nineteenth century. It was first used by John O’Mahony, a supporter of the republican cause, who drew upon the
medieval saga of Fionn Mac Cumhailand the army of ‘Fianna’. This group was responsible for several attempts at
uprising including the rising of 1848 and 1868. Both attempts failed due to a lack of organization. See R.F. Foster,
Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (New York: Penguin Books, 1988).
17
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group and their failed attempt at rebellion in 1867 compelled then British Prime Minister
William Gladstone to reevaluate the British stance toward Ireland. As Thomas Hachey writes in
his work, British and Irish Separatism, “Gladstone recognized the nationalist sentiment in
Ireland, of which the Fenian movement was but a manifestation, represented a dangerous
alienation from Britain on the part of the ever-increasing numbers of the Irish Catholic
majority.”20 There was also considerable pressure from Catholics, both domestic and abroad for
the British to be removed from Ireland.21 Seeing the potential danger in this majority, Gladstone
attempted to institute reform within Ireland including expanded rights for tenant farmers leasing
land, as well as expanded opportunities for higher education. Gladstone was of the mind that the
Irish people were a noble and hardworking group whose only defects were the result of Britain’s
oppression.22 These reforms were bounced back and forth in Parliament for the better part of two
decades as Gladstone’s Liberal Party moved in and out of power until, finally, he was able to
bring the nationalists’ main concern, Home Rule, before the Parliament in 1886.23 By supporting
the Home Rule Bill of 1886 Gladstone was able to displace Benjamin Disraeli, the leader of the
Tories, and ascend to Prime Minister once more. The terms of the bill, while not achieving
everything that Irish leaders wanted, allowed for greater freedom and self-governance. However,
Home Rule did not come to fruition in 1886. The House of Commons found the idea of Irish
self-governance too unpalatable at the time to carry the bill through to the end.24 Despite the

20

Thomas E. Hachey, Britain and Irish Separatism: From the Fenians to the Free State 1867/1922 (Chicago: Rand
McNally College Publishing, 1977).
21
“Home Rule for Ireland”, The Catholic World, April 1874; 19, 109. p.54.
22
D.W. Bebbington, The Mind of Gladstone: Religion, Homer, and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), 290.
23
Hachey, British and Irish Separatism, 15-26.
24
The bill came at a time when many of Britain’s holdings were experience unrest including South Africa, Egypt,
and Afghanistan. Therefore, despite the fact that most nationalists did not want to sever ties with the empire
completely, many in Westminster felt that Irish Home Rule was a threat to the Empire itself. See Kevin Kenny,
Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004).
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growing militant nature of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the rejection of the Home Rule Bill
of 1886 did not spark a violent rejoinder.25
While things remained relatively quiet after the death of the 1886 bill, the next decade
saw an increase in tension. Following the failure of the first Home Rule bill Gladstone was able
to bring a second bill to the floor in 1893.26 However, this time the bill would not find its death
in the House of Commons, but rather the Conservative controlled House of Lords. This led not
only to the resignation of Gladstone as Prime Minister, but also sparked an awakening of Irish
nationalism and culture over the next several years.27 There was a revival of Irish culture as
people found an appreciation for Irish literature, Irish athletics, and Irish solidarity. Groups such
as Sinn Féin began to form, rallying around the disenfranchisement of the Irish.28 Sinn Féin,
while initially a rather low level political group with few members, represented the nationalist
ideal for the future of Ireland. Eventually it became the leading social and political group during
the brutality of the Anglo-Irish war. It has continued to have an impact upon Irish politics,
society, and culture to this day.29
Amidst this growing nationalist fervor, a third attempt at passing a Home Rule Bill was
initiated in 1912. This shows that although Irish nationalists were growing in number,
constitutional attempts at Home Rule were still perceived to be a possibility. The 1912 bill

25

Hachey, 28; It should be noted that the Fenian Movement and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) are both
used interchangeable to describe the nationalist movement within Ireland throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
26
Bill to amend provision for Government of Ireland [as amended in Committee, and on Consideration] (Enhanced
British Parliamentary Papers On Ireland)
http://www.dippam.ac.uk/eppi/documents/18825/page/506444 (accessed April 27, 2015)
27
Hachey, Britain and Irish Separatism, 32.
28
Sinn Fein formed out of earlier nationalist movements and coalesced in 1905; Hachey, Britain and Irish
Separatism, 38-57.
29
Sinn Fein was founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith and when translated from Gaelic means ‘Ourselves’ or ‘We are
It’. See Richard Bennett, The Black and Tans (London: Edward Hulton, 1959), 11.
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offered an Irish legislature in Dublin, as well as Irish representation in the Westminster
Parliament. While the terms were acceptable to the nationalists, the minority Protestant unionists
saw themselves being underrepresented in a system that would presumably be dominated by
Catholics. This led to the formation of two opposing forces; the Ulster Volunteers comprised of
unionist Protestant Irish, and the Irish Volunteers consisting of primarily Catholic, republican
Irish. The former was, of course opposed to the idea of home rule and any legislation that
severed ties with Great Britain, while the latter was in favor of the bill. Meanwhile both formed
militant groups prepared to fight whomever for primacy on the issue.30 As these groups formed,
small pockets of violence began to break out. Despite the violence, the ‘Government of Ireland
Act’ was passed in 1914 and was given Royal assent with the caveat that home rule would not
take effect until after the resolution of World War I.31 While this was certainly a victory for those
who sought to sever ties with Britain by peaceful means, some Irish republicans found the delay
to be unacceptable.
What these early chapters in Home Rule demonstrate is the repeated frustration felt by
the Irish republicans. The vacillation back and forth so many times on the issue caused more and
more people to be drawn to the cause, and the movement in turn took on an increasingly martial
attitude. Conversely, as Irish nationalists began to receive concessions from Britain, the
Protestant minority especially in the North, saw an erosion of representation within Ireland.
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Tensions were mounting as World War I began, which set the stage for continued conflict
between the Irish and Great Britain. As Ireland contributed a significant number of men to the
war there were those who saw the conflict as a chance to force greater autonomy.32
Contemporary writer R.C. Escouflaire noted that Ireland’s food supplies were vital to the British
war effort. He went on to write, “If she refuses to send over her surplus…what a catastrophe
there would be! Well, without Home Rule, she tries to play this scurvy trick; the Sinn Féiners
intimidate the farmers who want to export their pigs, and vow that if they were masters it would
be their supreme joy to starve the accursed English. The old motto still triumphs, “’England’s
difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity.’”33 Naturally, this created a serious national security problem
for Britain. As the war continued the British military was forced to devote valuable intelligence
agents to keep an eye on nationalists who were thought to sympathize with the Germans. As
Escouflaire noted, “Sinn Féin began to talk of ‘our brave allies the Germans,’…Obviously Irish
sympathies were drawing closer and closer to Berlin.”34 These fears became reality when
evidence of the circumstances leading up to the Easter Rising of 1916 were uncovered.
The Easter Rising
The Easter Rising began in 1916 amidst the confusion and chaos of the First World War.
The British government had been gathering intelligence that led them to believe the Irish
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nationalists were connected in some sort of arrangement with the Germans. It was not until the
12th of April that the British intercepted a message that the Germans were to supply the Irish
nationalists with twenty-thousand rifles, ten machine guns and five million rounds of
ammunition.35 Further, British diplomat turned Irish rebel, Sir Roger Casement was being
transported back to Ireland by U-boat around the same time. The British seized the munitions, as
well as Casement on the 22nd of April. This proved to be a crucial blow to the Easter Rising.
During his trial, following the rebel defeat in Dublin a letter was produced written by their leader
Padraig Pearse, saying, “I understand that the German expedition on which I was counting
actually set sail but was defeated by the British.” 36 Pearse was counting on the arrival of the
German munitions so he could properly arm his men for the planned uprising. At this point the
British saw the need to arrest all the prominent leaders of the Irish Volunteers and Sinn Féin.
Unbeknown to the British, the rebels were planning to attack strategic sites within Dublin on the
24th of April, 1916, Easter Monday.
The Rising began, without German armaments, when Padraig Pearse, naming himself
Commandant-General of the Irish Republican Army, occupied the General Post Office in
Dublin.37 At the same time several other strategic points such as the Jacob’s Biscuit Factory, the
Four Courts, St. Stephens Green, the South Dublin Workhouse, and Boland’s Flour Mill were
taken by future Sinn Féin leader Eamon de Valera. After occupying these positions the rebels
thought that the citizens of Dublin would flock to their cause. However, leaders of the movement
severely undercut their connection to the people by allying themselves with the Germans and
thus the Central Powers. With many of Ireland’s young men fighting against the Central Powers
35
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in World War I, the citizens of Dublin were not compelled to support the IRA’s militant action.
As Richard Bennett wrote in his work The Black and Tans, “Never in the history of Ireland had a
rebellion inspired so little sympathy. There were nearly a hundred thousand Catholic Irishmen
fighting with the British Army, and the rebellion seemed as much a stab in the back to the
majority of Irish people as it did to the English.”38 Even without the support of the Dublin
citizens, the IRA had no real strategy beyond the occupation of these positions. The plan was to
occupy and wait for the British response.
The first response came not from the British, but from two Irish battalions, the 3rd Royal
Irish Rifle and the 10th Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The two battalions pinned the rebels down with
heavy shelling from field guns, as well as from the HMS Asgard which added to the Dublin
bombardment from the river Liffey. In the days that followed, over sixteen-thousand troops
entered the city and pinned the I.R.A in their remaining positions. It was at this point that
Commandant-General Pearse saw that the Rising was a failure.39 He had lost sixty-four men, the
civilian casualties were at 210 with over six hundred wounded, while the British had only lost
134 soldiers.40
Following the Rising in Dublin, the rebels were put on trial. As it was wartime, the rebels
were tried in an all military court which was allowed by subsection one of the ‘Defence of the
Realm Act’. It was reasonable to assume that the members of the IRA and Sinn Féin who took
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part in such treasonous activities would be executed.41 Indeed many, including Pearse, were
executed on 3 May, 1916.42 His final statement in the military court was:
My sole object in surrendering unconditionally was to save the slaughter of the
civil population and to save the lives of our followers who had been led into this
thing by us. It is my hope that the British government who has shown its strength
will also be magnanimous and spare the lives and give an amnesty to my
followers, as I am one of the persons chiefly responsible, have acted as C in C and
president of the provisional government. I am prepared to take the consequences
of my act. But I went down on my knees as a child and told God that I would
work all my life to gain the freedom of Ireland. I have deemed it my duty as an
Irishman to have organized men to fight against Britain.43

While Pearse and several other key members of the IRA and Sinn Féin were executed, there
were those such as Eamon de Valera and Michael Collins who managed to escape execution. In
total 160 rebels were tried by the military courts and fifteen were executed.44 It is important to
note de Valera and Collins managed to escape execution, as they soon became two of the most
prominent figures in the Anglo-Irish War. Certainly, there were none who created more
problems for the British, and specifically the Black and Tans, than Michael Collins. While the
trials were going on, in London Prime Minister Asquith announced the names of those who were
to be executed to a House of Commons that bore no objection. However, it was MP John
Redmond who foresaw the violence to come with the comment, “...that out of the ashes of this
miserable tragedy there may spring up something that may re-bound.”45 Certainly this sentiment
could be felt as those who were not sentenced to death were marched toward cattle boats for
deportation and imprisonment. Men who were previously jeered by Dublin citizens for their
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foolish and haphazard Rising were then met with cheers of adoration when they returned home.
The manner in which the British handled the trials of the republicans, and their subsequent
executions, did far more to stir nationalist fervor in Ireland than it did to quell it.46
Following the executions of the sixteen rebels a wave of pro-nationalist and pro-Sinn
Féin sentiment swept over the country.47 The situation was made even more tense by the
termination of yet another attempt at Home Rule. The crux of the issue was the inclusion of a
plan for partitioning Ulster in the north, from the republican South. The republicans were
strongly opposed to partition wanting a united Ireland, meanwhile Ulster unionists would not
support any Home Rule attempt as long as it did not have partition at the heart of it.
With support for Sinn Féin at its height, the party swept the 1918 elections with seventythree constituencies to the Unionists’ twenty-five, and the Irish Parliamentary Party’s meager
seven. It is this point that served to embolden Irish republicans. They saw Sinn Féin and other
elected candidates not as members of the Westminster Parliament of Great Britain, but rather as
the acting parliament of Ireland, known as the Dáil Éireann.48 Soon thereafter, Eamon de Valera
was appointed President of the Dáil and Prime Minister of Ireland following his escape from
Lincoln Gaol.49 Along with de Valera the de facto government was established when the Offices
of State were filled by members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, or those who had
connections to it including Minister of Finance Michael Collins. It is important to consider that
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while republicans saw the Dublin-based Dáil as the legitimate parliament in Ireland, Britain in no
way recognized it.50
It is clear that the Easter Rising marks a turning point in the means by which autonomy
would be sought. Violence was the new form of negotiation. With the execution of the I.R.A and
Sinn Féin leaders, the British only served to make martyrs for the cause. There was no going
back for either side, with the result being several years of war and bloodshed before the two sides
would be brought back to the table for negotiations.
The State of Policing in Ireland
Prior to the arrival of the Black and Tans, as well as other supplemental auxiliary units,
the Royal Irish Constabulary had been the principal police force in Ireland. This force was
established in May of 1836 with the primary directive to maintain law and order beyond the
boundaries of any one city or county.51 Prior to this time police forces operated in the individual
counties and were ruled by a Chief Inspector. After Sir Robert Peel was appointed as Home
Secretary in 1812 the police system saw a reorganization. After forming the London
Metropolitan Police Force in 1829, Peel quickly earned a reputation as an expert in policing.
Although Peel initiated the reformation of policing in Ireland, he did not see its conclusion as
Home Secretary. As Thomas Fennell, a former constable recalls, “[a] belief generally held was
that the police of Peel’s time as Chief Secretary was the same Force that came down from that
time as the RIC. This was quite a mistaken view.”52 Rather, it was more than six years after Peel
had stepped down as Home Secretary that the Constabulary Act and its amendment received
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royal assent on 28 July, 1836 as Acts 6 and 7 William IV.53 Fennell recounts that though Peel did
not establish the RIC, members of the force were often still given the derogatory nickname
‘Peelers’.54
Regardless of who drafted the legislation that brought the RIC to life, the force was
comprised mostly of Catholic Irish. This was a significant change from traditional practice,
which barred Catholics from serving in any police force. However, the Catholic Emancipation
Act of 1829 ensured that the non-officer ranks of the RIC were filled with Catholics. Meanwhile,
the officers were almost entirely Protestant.
At this point it is important to discuss the term ‘paramilitary’. The police forces
considered in this study can all be considered paramilitary police forces. The RIC, the Black and
Tans, the Auxiliaries, the British Gendarmerie, and the Palestine Police cannot be classified in
the same category as a force such as the British Metropolitan Police. The real difference between
a traditional force such as the British Metropolitan Police and paramilitary force is the kind of
tasks that are required of them. Metropolitans police carry out the duties that commonly come to
mind when thinking about police work; criminal investigation, apprehension of suspects, and
working with the judicial system to levy appropriate punishments for crime. Paramilitary police
forces are asked to carry out these duties, as well as duties that more closely resemble military
operations. These operations can include, at least for the forces considered in this study, armed
patrol, bomb removal, armed escort operations, and intelligence gathering. Perhaps the most
visible distinction between traditional police and paramilitary police is how they are armed. The
British Metropolitan Police, for example were not armed and routinely carried out unarmed foot

53
54

Great Britain, House of Lords, Parliamentary Debate 28 July 1836, vol. 35 c603. [Hereafter cited as HL]
Fennell, The Royal Irish Constabulary, 7.

23

patrols. Meanwhile, the forces considered in this study were trained in the use of pistols, rifles,
and automatic weapons and often carried out mounted patrols in armored cars. Essentially,
paramilitary police were responsible for all the duties of a traditional police officer, yet also
needed to be capable of fulfilling any extraordinary duty in a specific region.
Fennell recounts that although the official founding of the RIC took place in 1836, the
real birth of a paramilitary force didn’t happen until 1840 with the establishment of the Royal
Irish Constabulary Depot, Phoenix Park. It was here that men were trained and drilled in a
military fashion. They wore military style uniforms and always had former military officers in
the upper echelon of command. 55 Initially they were given normal police duties; keeping the
peace and investigating crimes. However, perhaps their most important duty, especially in the
eyes of the British Government, was to help in the collection of land taxes. This practice carried
with it the perpetuation of landlordism within Ireland. Fennell tells us that many of the recruits
did not realize that this would be such a large part of their job until several years into the service.
By that time, “no matter how distasteful it was, they had then in most cases reached a time when
they were obliged to continue.”56 Many of the men had families to support and could not afford
to quit. The young recruit spent his first several years in the Depot training and drilling until a
vacancy opened up in a county. By the time the constable finally was sent to his post it was
likely that he had already married and started a family. This practice of helping to collect taxes
did not sit well with the constable or the general populace of Ireland. Still, this did not manifest
into animosity between the people and the RIC. Citizens knew that the constables were obliged
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to do a job that they also found distasteful.57 This relationship would remain relatively
unchanged until the start of the Anglo-Irish War in 1920.
During the war, the nature of policing for the RIC changed. The force certainly retained
their military foundation, but its real talent was in the gathering of intelligence. Georgina Sinclair
describes them as being “designed to keep Ireland’s population under what amounted to colonial
subjugation, the RIC developed as a centralized body of armed men. In carrying out extraneous
duties, the RIC effectively became the ‘eyes and ears’ of government…”58 Given this proficiency
in intelligence gathering, the Irish Volunteers saw the RIC as high value targets. Understanding
the importance of hindering RIC activities, rebel members of the Irish Volunteers first stole a
shipment of explosives in Soloheadbeg, County Tipperary, and killed two police constables in
the process on the 21 January 1919. The rebels went on to kill fifteen more constables
throughout the year. However, the tipping point came with the failed assassination attempt on
Viscount French, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland on 19 December 1919. Following this action,
things began to move quickly as D.M. Leeson describes: “Beginning on January 1920, the
British Army was given special powers to combat the insurgents, and the security forces carried
out mass arrests of republican leaders.”59These powers included the detention of large groups of
suspects, as well as becoming a much more heavily armed force. Although the Royal Irish
Constabulary was extremely well trained and disciplined, they were not prepared to fight a
guerilla war. Leeson makes reference to a large number of men who began to resign because of
the new, more brutal nature of their work. Along with this new work came a partition plan that
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divided Ulster from the rest of the country along with the establishment of provincial parliaments
for each in 1920. The partition only served to instigate the nationalists because of Ulster’s loyalty
to the crown. All the while more police were being killed.
Amidst the mounting violence, it is important to note that there were moments of
chivalric behavior in the early days of the conflict. As Cottrell points out, “…there were
instances of the IRA shouting warnings before they opened fire, and of policemen giving up their
service revolvers and Lee Enfield .303cal rifles without a fight and being sent on their way.”60
However, as time went on gentlemanly acts such as these became almost nonexistent. The Irish
Volunteers, being referred to almost exclusively as the IRA by this time, began to ambush Royal
Irish Constabulary patrols and barracks in the spring and summer of 1920, killing eighty-three
constables. Also, Michael Collins began to run highly successful counter-intelligence operations
that effectively neutralized any advantage the British may have had enjoyed. Bennett describes
Collins as cycling, “…every day from his Ministry of Finance offices in Mary Street and St.
Andrew’s Street to his Intelligence Office at No. 5 Mespil Road, where he sat working behind
lace curtains, a revolver on his desk.”61 The situation had become dire. With the Constabulary on
the verge of collapse and Collins outwitting the intelligence service, there was not much hope for
the British to restore order.62
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The training that the RIC underwent seems to have been of a high quality. It combined
not only military-style drill, but also rigorous examination on police work. As one recruit
described the training, “Phoenix Park was tough, it was far worse than the army, the drill, oh, it
was tough, although you were glad to have some kind of job.”63 However, it is clear that there
was some kind of balance that existed between the physical requirements of the job and the
necessary discipline of knowing the law and being able to enforce it. To this end it appears that if
recruits were unable grasp the law and order aspect of their duties, they were held back. William
Dunn, who joined the RIC in 1917, recalls the standards for examinations: “the Commandant had
you out there in the square and then you were taken in the school and you had to pass through all
those things. We worked fairly hard, you know, I mean you had to, you didn’t want to be put
back.”64 This insistence on knowing the law and being able to enforce it is vital to understanding
the deterioration of policing standards in Ireland during the Anglo-Irish War. As the situation
became increasingly violent, more emphasis was placed upon the military aspects of the job and
police knowledge became secondary.
Ambush and Reprisal: Black and Tan Violence in the Anglo-Irish War
Britain’s answer to violence was the hotly contested ‘Restoration of Order in
Ireland Act’. 65 Following this act the face of ‘policing’ changed in Ireland. As Leeson
describes the situation, the Royal Irish Constabulary became “an irregular military force,
bound by neither military law nor military discipline…”66 It was at this point in March of
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1920 that the Royal Irish Constabulary began to recruit ex-British soldiers to supplement
its faltering numbers. 67The Constabulary was not logistically prepared for such a great
influx of recruits. They were forced to cobble together uniforms by either wearing a
khaki tunic and dark green pants, or dressed entirely in British military khaki. The
uniform was also outfitted with a black leather belt, sometimes a black leather trench
coat, and often a dark green tam-o’-shanter cap.68 Upon arriving in Limerick, the locals
began to call the units ‘The Black and Tans’, likening their appearance to a famous pack
of hunting dogs. Along with the uniforms, these new recruits were paid a handsome sum
of ten shillings per day.69 This high rate of pay was very attractive for many former
service men who had returned home and found it difficult to find work.70
When the men recruited for the unit arrived in Ireland, it was necessary for them to be
trained as quickly as possible because of the urgency and high rate of attrition among officers.
One individual who had experience early on in the Anglo-Irish War and beyond was Douglas
Valder Duff. During World War I, Duff served aboard the H.M.S Conway, as well as the Thracia
in service of the Merchant Navy at the early age of thirteen. In 1917 Duff’s ship was sunk by a
German U-Boat leaving him as the only survivor. Soon thereafter, Duff’s next ship, Flavia, was
also torpedoed by a German U-Boat. For nearly two years after the war Duff entered a monastery
to become monk in fulfilment of a promise he made to himself while floating amongst the
flotsam and jetsam of the Thracia. Despite his time as a monk, Duff moved on to join the Black
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and Tans for over a year.71 Duff recalls his training in Ireland being very rushed and feeble in its
pretense of effectiveness. Still, the type of training a recruit received depended upon what kind
of experience they had prior to their posting in Ireland. Duff recounts the Head Constable Major
saying, “All you scabs that have served in the Infantry will receive three days’ training and will
then be posed to County stations.”72 Meanwhile any recruits that had experience in the cavalry,
artillery, technical corps, Navy, Air Force, Merchant Service, or coming in as civilians, were to
receive up to a month of training before being sent out to their stations. Duff lied about being in
the Infantry in order to avoid a prolonged training regimen. This shortened version of training
consisted of an afternoon of explosive and small arm instruction, followed by a day of classroom
instruction on the laws the men were going to enforce. This is important to note as these men
were expected to keep law and order, but many only received one day of instruction on the law.
By the third morning, the recruits were considered fully trained and ready for action.73 As Duff
was ambushed on his first escort mission he mused about how quickly his old life as a monk had
transitioned into something very different: “A week ago, I had been meek Brother Lawrence,
scared of my portly, sallow Provincial, now I was here, firing with intent to kill an armed enemy
who had just done his utmost to cut short my career.”74 What Duff’s account shows us is that the
men drawn into the Black and Tans were barely trained beyond their previous military training.
What training they did receive certainly did not prepare them to maintain order by regular means
as civil policemen.
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For those who did not have any military experience they could look forward to a month
of training with a heavy emphasis on military-style drill. George Crawford, who joined in June
1920, described the process as follows:
At the time it was all military training, you were got up by bugle in the morning at
six o’ clock, revile went at six and tattoo went at ten at night, and you answered
roll-call. From six in the morning till five in the evening you were continually at
drill. At school we did Acts of Parliament and all sorts of police duties. The whole
day was taken up and you never had more than about fifteen minutes between
each, either school or drill or gym. We were taught bayonet fighting and the usual
military stuff.75

While Crawford does describe ‘police duties’ as part of the training, it is clear from other
accounts that the policing aspect of training was not given priority. This is exacerbated by the
fact that most of these recruits were largely uneducated. Robert Crossett, who joined in 1920 and
became a member of the Black and Tans, recalled many ‘sad’ memories of training. Although he
claimed to have a great memory and was able to remember some pieces of information from the
Police Manual, he “wasn’t able to read well and every school [session] was a battle.” 76 He went
on to say, “I wasn’t a good policeman. I was a good enough policeman, I done the work as well
as any of them, but if I had been left on my own, like, I would have been hopeless.”77 Between
the former service men who received little training in police work, and the former farmers who
had just recently been taught military expertise, the new recruits who were posted throughout
Ireland were ill prepared to peacefully and effectively subdue a hostile population.
It did not take long for the rest of Black and Tans to begin their work. Following the
assassination of a head constable in Balbriggan, County Dublin on September 20th, 1920, the
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Black and Tans laid waste to the town. By the end of the night two men were killed, over fortynine houses were either razed or badly damaged, four public houses were looted and
subsequently burned, and finally a hosiery factory was destroyed.78 The Black and Tans in
concert with the Royal Irish Constabulary regulars made it known that any rebel activities taken
up by the I.R.A would be met with frightening reprisals.
The question then is why did the Black and Tans resort to such overwhelmingly violent
responses to republican violence? Many historians have argued that the Black and Tans were
damaged products of the First World War. The argument has been that the Black and Tans’
previous training and experience in trench warfare did not translate into effective policing of IRA
guerrilla warfare. While this is all true Leeson goes further to assert that it was the Royal Irish
Constabulary who showed the Black and Tans the order of business in Ireland. As he writes, the
“…Black and Tans, had military training and combat experience, but they were fish out of water
in Ireland, where they soon picked up the bad habits of their Irish comrades, and worse.”79 While
it may be the case that the Constabulary used harsh tactics, the Black and Tans took violence to
new heights during their time in Ireland. Following the Balbriggan reprisal the Tans made it very
clear to the citizens of Drogheda that they were here to keep order, and that order would be kept
by all necessary means. This warning was printed in the Advocate, as well as canvassed across
the town,
DROGHEDA BEWARE
If in the vicinity a policeman is shot, five of the leading Sinn
Féiners will be shot. It is not coercion – it is an eye for an eye. We
are not drink-maddened savages as we have been described in the
Dublin rags. We are not out for loot. We are inoffensive to women.
We are as humane as other Christians, but we have restrained
ourselves for too long. Are we to lie down while our comrades are
78
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being shot in cold blood by the coroner boys and ragamuffins of
Ireland? We say ‘Never’, and all the inquires in the world will not
stop our desire for revenge. Stop the shooting of police, or we will
lay low every house that smells of Sinn Féin. Remember
Balbriggan.
(By Order) Black and Tans.80

Warnings such as this did little to dissuade the IRA from continuing their pattern of surprise
attacks on the Black and Tans. In most cases, the violence only increased.
There were some counties in Ireland where the level of violence was higher than
others. The IRA and the Black and Tans had a particularly bloody history in County
Galway. The conflict first began with the ambush of a Black and Tan patrol on July 19th,
1920 which left two dead. Following this ambush, the constables ransacked the town
looking for those responsible. Amidst the chaos, several buildings were set ablaze, some
with women and children still inside. Unable to find those responsible, the Tans moved to
homes of known Sinn Féin members. In one instance Eamon Casey’s door was kicked in
and he was ordered out at gunpoint. William Henry in his work, Blood for Blood: The
Black and Tan War in Galway, describes the Tans entering Casey’s home: “his wife, who
was standing in the hall, implored them not to kill her husband. One of the policemen
raised his rifle to hit her; he stopped when Casey asked them not to kill him in front of
her. The head constable then intervened and order his men out of the house. Before
releasing Casey, the policemen warned him that they would ‘get’ him within three
weeks.”81 Casey was not the only target of this kind of harassment. In the ensuing month
I.R.A commanding officer, Michael Moran was arrested, imprisoned, set free, rearrested,
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and finally murdered while in Black and Tan custody. During his funeral procession the
Black and Tans attempted to break the ranks of IRA members following the hearse.82
Similar attacks continued through the following months. One particularly brazen ambush
took place less than a mile from Renmore Barracks in Oranmore, County Galway on August 21st.
As the police patrol made its way through Merlin Park, they passed under a bridge toward a
hilled area beyond. The plan was, that once the patrol had made it past the bridge, IRA men atop
the bridge would open fire, and the real ambush would come from the hilled areas on either side
of the road. However, the two men on the bridge, Baby Duggan and Maurice Mullins, opened
fire too early not allowing for the ambush to be sprung. Still, in retreat constable Martin Foley
was shot and killed while the others returned to Renmore to raise the alarm. After Black and
Tans had investigated the scene, they showed some measure of restraint that night in their
questioning of the townsfolk. This restraint was slowly chipped away by various fights that
broke out during their investigation. Eventually, the inquiries devolved into the usual brand of
Black and Tan justice. The police went to known republican houses shooting indiscriminately
and setting them on fire. 83 An article in The New Republic described the situations in Oranamore
as follows:
The fact that the successful insurrection in Ireland irritates and bores the average
Englishman instead of infuriating him, will of course, encourage the Irish
nationalists to persist. No doubt a mixture of irritation may breed temporary
callousness to the means which are used to obtain relief, but when these means fail
an irritated and bored public is not likely to insist indefinitely in its ill-doing84
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What is important about these instances in Galway is that they were representative of the
violence occurring throughout the country.85 Ambushes and assassinations in one county inspired
not only more ambushes and assassinations in other counties, but also police reprisals. It was
reported in The Times that police forces in County Longford burned down the homes of local
Sinn Féin leaders while yelling, ‘Up Tuam!’86 Hence, we see a cyclical pattern of republican
violence being met with even greater reprisals from the Black and Tans. As summer faded into
fall the numbers started to add up; the British in Ireland “…had lost fifty-four police and twelve
soldiers killed. One hundred police and fifty-four soldiers had been wounded, and forty-nine
police and eighty soldiers were disarmed; thirty-three court houses had been destroyed and
seventeen damaged; eight defended barracks had been destroyed, four damaged and twenty
unsuccessfully attacked.”87
What came following the back and forth violence of the summer and fall was an event
widely considered to be a turning point in the conflict, as well as one of the most crucial
moments in the republican cause; Bloody Sunday. While there are several events in Irish history
that have earned the title, ‘Bloody Sunday’ that occurred on the 21st of November, 1920, is
arguably the most prominent. It began with Michael Collins’ need to cripple British intelligence
in Dublin. Through clandestine sources, Collins gathered the names of several prominent British
intelligence members and put together a group of assassins to carry out a coordinated attack. 88
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On the morning of November 21st the assassins, many of whom were part of Collins elite
‘Squad,’ forced their way into homes throughout Dublin and carried out the deed. 89 Some of the
attacks were thwarted by security forces, still, many of the names Collins had gathered were
murdered in their beds. By the end of the day, “Fourteen bodies, nine of them in pyjamas, were
taken to the morgue…”90 Several of those killed were not on the list, but by Collins’ own
admission had to be taken care of for what they had seen.91 The following day the blood letting
continued when security forces looking for the ‘Bloody Sunday’ perpetrators fired into a crowd
of civilians at a football match in Croke Park.92
The events in Galway and Dublin previously described represent the kind of large-scale
attack and reprisal engagements that characterized the relationship between the I.R.A and the
Black and Tans. However, in these engagements the body counts were relatively low. Starting in
December 1920 martial law was declared in Ireland as violence began to increase. This
continued throughout most of 1921, albeit on a smaller, but more frequent ‘tit for tat’ basis. All
the while, Prime Minister Lloyd George was pursuing a truce with de Valera and Collins.93 It is
strange to think that all of these events were running alongside one another. General Nevil
Macready rhetorically asked, “Where except in Ireland, or possibly in a South American
Republic, could open rebellion, martial law, peace proposals and a General Election be all
running side by side?”94 On July 8th, 1921 a truce was negotiated that would eventually lead to
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the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December.95 Under the Treaty the ‘Southern Irish Free State’ became a
self- governing dominion under Great Britain. In addition it received complete independence in
its domestic affairs. As the New Republic described the agreement, “It is not a new idea, but it
looks promising today because it evades the difficulty of surrender of territory by Ulster, it
preserves the unity of Ireland, which would be shattered by a boundary commission operating a
new partition, and it holds out the prospect of an increasing measure of unity…”96 While this
agreement upset many nationalists in Ireland who felt that Ulster should be part of the republic,
the treaty was signed all the same. Still, the empire was losing one of its longest held colonial
possessions, and some felt that it was for the best. As The New Republic reported, “the
immediate threat to the security of the British Empire comes not from the abandonment of
military rule over rebellious people but from its continuation.”97 Regardless, the war was over for
the Black and Tans who were dismissed from their duties. Violence did not leave the Emerald
Isle, but the blood was no longer going to be on the hands of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries.
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Britain and a normal life. However, the British Empire had great need for their particular set of
skills elsewhere. Members of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and especially the Black and Tans,
reenlisted to aid in the development of colonial policing throughout the empire.99 One area where
many Black and Tans, including Duff, found themselves was in Palestine serving under the
newly formed ‘British Gendarmerie’.100 From this background of relatively poor training, the
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security forces used the real-world experience gained in Ireland, and built upon it in the Palestine
Mandate.
What the Anglo-Irish War represents, as far as the evolution of British colonial policing
is concerned is a foundation from which policing could grow. The RIC was already established
as a reliable and effective police force yet as the war began, new inexperienced recruits were
taken on and not properly trained in traditional police methods. Instead the security forces had to
rely on the military training that most of them had acquired during the First World War. This
lack of training when coupled with a population that was committed to breaking away the British
Empire meant that violence was all but unavoidable. Still, as a large portion of the security forces
in Ireland moved into the Palestine Mandate, the lessons learned served to improve the efficiency
of British colonial policing over the next twenty-five years.
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Chapter II: Transition and the Holy Land
In Palestine, the situation into which the security forces from Ireland were entering was
completely unknown to them. At the time of their departure from Europe a number of
developments had occurred in the Middle East. The First World War had ended and Britain was
charged with the stewardship of the Palestine Mandate. The Palestine Police had been
established, and in its infancy, had already faced a number of challenges. Perhaps most
importantly, Jewish immigrants were coming into the region, and Arabs living in Palestine
perceived the threat of being pushed into an economic and territorial periphery as a result of
increased immigration.
The security forces faced other challenges before even setting foot in the Holy Land. The
Black and Tans and Auxiliaries had earned a reputation for brutal tactics and bad behavior in
Ireland. Many wondered if this same brand of policing was going to be exported to Palestine.
Also, these men were entering into a battle between competing nationalist movements. These
nationalist conflicts in many respects were unique to Palestine, but in some respects were quite
similar to those at play in Ireland.
Despite the challenges, these men managed to overcome many of the difficulties facing
them. The bloody reputation of Ireland did not follow them very far into the Mandate. In fact,
considering the time in which the Irish security forces entered the Palestine Mandate, it is
remarkable to learn that the period of the Gendarmerie was the most peaceful in the territory’s
history. It is the object of this chapter to chart the transition of the security forces from Ireland
into the Palestine Mandate in order to demonstrate the evolution in policing methods. This is
done first by examining the situation in the Middle East during and after the First World War as
it pertains to the Palestine Mandate. Next, an account of policing in the Mandate is given to
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address: the establishment of the Palestine Police, the recruitment of the Irish security forces into
the British Gendarmerie, and finally their training and activities during the Mandate. Lastly, the
disbanding of the British Gendarmerie and its absorption into the Palestine Police is discussed
and analyzed.
The Middle East During and After the First World War
It is important to understand the origins of the Mandate in order to appreciate the
preexisting tensions encountered by security forces in Palestine. Moreover, the political
decisions made, the conditions of Imperial control, and influx of Jewish settlers led directly to a
dangerous situation that was both unique and strikingly similar to that of Ireland during the
Anglo-Irish War. The Mandate was created because it was the opinion of European Leaders that
the region could not govern itself and would need a fair amount of facilitation before selfgovernment could be achieved. However, two years after the end of World War II Palestine was
one of the few territories in the region that had not been moved along the path toward selfgovernment.101
During the First World War, the British Government knew that success in the Middle
East and the fall of the Ottoman Empire meant that stewardship of the region would fall upon
them as victors. As it has already been suggested, we cannot really claim to understand the
underlying motivations of Irish nationalists without understanding the contentious history that
existed between Ireland and Great Britain. So too in the case of Palestine. An understanding of
how the Palestine Mandate came to be allows us to better understand the fragile situation into
which police forces were placed. The promises made on behalf of the British Government to
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Zionist and Arab leaders sowed the seeds of discontent and rebellion. The fruits of British labor
would then have to be tended to years later by the security forces charged with policing the
Mandate. This section will examine the British, French, and Jewish elements that came together
during and after the First World War to plan spheres of influence within the ‘Near East’ and how
they created a situation of accelerated nationalism.
Around the same time the Easter Rising was taking place in Ireland, the Triple Entente
was making plans for the end of World War I. Anticipating the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the
British and French in November of 1915, began to discuss how the Middle East would be
divided up and controlled following the war.102 By 16 May 1916, Britain and France, led in
secret discussion by Sir Mark Sykes and Francois Georges-Picot, settled upon the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, officially known as the Asia Minor Agreement.103 By the terms of this arrangement,
the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided between the British and French. The
British would be given control of the Haifa, Acre, Southern Iraq and the coastal region between
the Mediterranean Sea and the River Jordan.104 Meanwhile the French were to be given Lebanon,
Syria, Northern Iraq, and Southeastern Turkey.105 In years to follow, Sykes saw the strategic
importance of the Palestine region. In correspondence with Picot, Sykes began to broach the
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subject of the Entente’s interest in the future of Palestine, in reference to the area between the
Jordan and the Mediterranean.106
This agreement, however, did not address the Zionist desire for the establishment of a
Jewish homeland.107 For several reasons, the British government and Foreign Secretary Arthur
James Balfour saw a Jewish homeland in Palestine as a necessity for postwar stability in the
region. In letters between Balfour and future Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, Jewish
nationalism was at the heart of the desire for a homeland. According to Weizmann, those true to
the Jewish faith were represented by those who expressed Jewish nationalism and Jewish
democracy. 108 With that end in mind Balfour issued the famous Balfour Declaration in a letter to
Zionist advocate, Lord Walter Rothschild, in November 1917. As the letter reads,
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non106
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Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews
in any other country.109

As the Balfour Declaration was made public in 1917 and the secret Sykes-Picot agreement was
revealed during the Bolshevik Revolution of the same year, both the Jews and Arabs felt that
their interests were not going to be met by the conflicting terms of the agreements. This was
exacerbated by the promises made by the British Government to Sharif Hussein and his sons to
transfer the Islamic Caliphate to them in return for their support against the Turks during World
War I. These matters were further complicated by other conflicting promises made by the
McMahon letters.110 To Arabs, the idea of not having an independent state free from British
control ran counter to promises that had been made earlier in the war. For Zionists, the wording
of the Balfour Declaration was not clear enough in specifically promising a Jewish state. 111
Over the next six years, even with the ending of the war, the exact boundaries of the
mandate were still being debated.112 It was not until September 29, 1923 after the signing of the
Treaty of Lausanne that the mandate was considered to be in full effect.113 However, this did not
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stop Jews from migrating into their promised land. With the steady influx of Jewish settlers
combined with an unhappy Palestinian Arab population, and a haphazard British presence in the
region, the situation quickly escalated.114
Attacks upon Jewish settlers became increasingly frequent and violent. In order to
combat this the British government sought to establish the British Gendarmerie, a paramilitary
police force that could protect the influx of Jewish settlers, as well as carry out a variety of
normal police actions. The British Gendarmerie became Winston Churchill’s solution to
alleviating the cost of garrisoning 7,000 British World War I soldiers in Palestine while also
maintaining peace in the region.115 The cost of keeping these troops in Palestine during 1922 was
£1,724,000.116
The State of Policing in Palestine
As former Palestine Police officer Edward Horne has written, “For Great Britain, police
work in Palestine began at the moment the first allied soldier set foot over the Egyptian
border…”117 Horne here is referring to January 9, 1917 when British military forces pushed
through Turkish lines and claimed their first position in Palestine. It was at that point that the
114
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military administration became responsible for the security of Palestine. As the military
continued to move through the region and occupy towns, it was common practice for an officer
to stay behind as Town Governor and impose military order so as to maintain public security and
peace. It was on December 9, 1917 that Jerusalem fell to British forces. The occupation and
transition to British administration was a relatively smooth process. The military found, in most
cases, a decently trained municipal police force that was capable of working under military rule.
In each of the towns a local police force existed, which operated independently of and did not
cooperate with other localities. Horne notes that the military was always eager to shed its
responsibility for public security as it was simply not what they were trained for. Moreover, due
to low pay there was simply no way that a force could be recruited locally.118 By November 1918
all of Palestine was firmly under the control of British military administration and the war had
come to a close.
With the end of hostilities, the administration of the region had to be revisited and so the
Occupied Enemy Territory Administration or OETA was established. The OETA was subdivided
into more manageable segments of which Palestine fell into the district of OETA South and was
under the purview of Major General Sir Harry Watson. It was Watson who highlighted the
necessity for a unified police force that was not subject to each locality. This mirrors the same
kind of directive that initiated the Constabulary Act of 1836 which created the Royal Irish
Constabulary. In both instances it was seen that a police force needed to be centrally controlled
and able to operate beyond the boundaries of a county or town. Watson left the task of bringing
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the well-trained municipal forces and the less reputable town forces together to Lt. Col. Percy B.
Bramley.119
Arriving in July, 1919, Bramley quickly began to take account of what he had to work
with in Palestine, traveling to stations across the region. He found the Turkish officers to be a
well-trained and reliable. One question that struck Bramley early on was the kind of uniform his
men would wear. As has already been shown in the previous chapter on Ireland, the uniform the
colonial police wore had a tendency to be one of the most recognizable and memorable aspects
of the police themselves. Although the Black and Tans were not yet formed at this time, their
uniforms are by far their most distinguishing visual element. Palestine was no exception.
Bramley knew that he needed to find a uniform that was adaptable to the climate that varied from
extremely cold in the hill-country winter and extremely hot in the summer valley regions. The
traditional Turkish uniform varied greatly and often did little to distinguish the policeman from
the average citizen. Thus, Bramley decided a standard blue tunic uniform for the winter and
khaki tunics with shorts for the summer. As for headdress, the Kalpak was decided upon because
it was not particularly ascribed to any religious or ethnic group.120
The uniting of municipal forces under Bramley technically gave rise to the Palestine
Police Fore. However it was not officially recognized until a year later.121 Still, during that time
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the force performed its duties well and only had one considerable incident to speak of; the
Jabotinsky Riots of 1920. The Jabotinsky Riot, also known as the Nebi Musa Riots, were a series
of riots that took place during the Nabi Musa festival between the 4th and 7th of April 1920. The
riots were a result of heightened tension between the relatively small number of Jewish settlers
and Arabs in the region. Zionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky helped to excite the tension between
Jews and Arabs during the Nebi Musa parade.122 According to reports, as the riot commenced on
the morning of the 4th, “it became necessary to reinforce the police by military assistance. The
police are believed to have sided with their co-religionists, and were withdrawn and
disarmed.”123 The rioting continued, unchanged through the 5th and 6th leaving two dead and 186
wounded when rioting abated on the 7th. The debate in Parliament concluded when Colonel
Wilfrid Ashley asked, “What steps have been taken to protect the Jews in their own country…?”
To which Mr. Bonar Law responded, “As my hon. and gallant Friend knows, meantime
responsibility for Palestine is on General Allenby, and I am sure that he is taking all proper
steps.”124
This riot and the subsequent debate that ensued in Parliament reveals a great deal about
the beginning of the policing, Arab-Jewish relations, and British official regard for both. This
moment in time was an unfortunate blemish on an otherwise commendable service record of the
early Palestine Police. It happened while Bramley was in the middle of really establishing the
force and uniting the municipal police. The fact that Col. Ashley refers to the ‘Jews in their own
country’ does suggest that some may have had pro-Zionist leanings. Certainly there were many
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who sought to remain neutral toward the Zionist cause as there was already a great deal of
international support for Jewish settlement in the region. Yet, it is important to note that
Jabotinsky was himself an immigrant to Jerusalem, and that it was Jabotinsky that incited the
riots with inflammatory speeches during the parade. Finally, we see from this debate that there
was a great amount of trust placed in military control of the region under Gen. Allenby. Yet there
is no mention, other than of their failure, of the police force.
Despite this early failing it can be said that the Palestine Police existed in name only
when the riot occurred and were completely ill-equipped to handle something it. In official terms
the Palestine Police were established on July 1, 1920 under the terms of the mandate granted to
Great Britain by the League of Nations. However it was not until later in the summer that the
force resembled anything official. By that time Bramley was able to name his senior aides,
including Major Alan Saunders, Major W.F. Wainright, F.A. Partridge, and E.V. Holdridge. The
force at that time had a strength of 1,515 men comprised of sixteen British Officers, fifty five
Palestinian Officers and 1,444 other ranks. These ‘other ranks’ were locally recruited, welltrained policemen who had received comprehensive instruction prior to the outbreak of World
War I.125 The next year, the force was supplemented with five-hundred locally procured men
known as the Palestine Gendarmerie. This separate force included the traditional ‘policeman-onfoot’ as well as constables on horseback and camelback. The primary directive of this force was
to control the border region.126 Still, even with the remarkable work done by Bramley, the force
did not have an established character. The disparate elements of a number of local police took
some time to solidify. This took another two years and the exit of the majority of military forces
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for this character to emerge. The military’s exit, by design of Winston Churchill, coincided with
the last piece of the Palestine security puzzle; the British Gendarmerie.
The British Gendarmerie and the Recruitment of the Irish Contingent
Prior to the formation of the British section of the Palestine Police, Winston Churchill
decided to create the British Gendarmerie. This decision was made after a conference in March
of 1921, which called together British experts committed to understanding the delicate situation
in the region. It was decided that the cost of garrisoning Palestine with troops was financially too
expensive for the Empire to bear. Although the military had been doing its best to keep the
peace, they were soldiers, not police officers. They simply did not have the requisite skill or
training to be effective. Furthermore, the military’s dissatisfaction with the Zionist immigration
complicated their continued stay in Palestine.127 Following the withdrawal of a significant
portion of the military presence, a new force was needed to help fill the void and assist the local
police force with tasks that fell outside the realm of normative police duties such as border
patrol, immigration control, and inter-district communication.128 Churchill, who had recently
been Colonial Secretary, wanted to transplant the model of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
into Palestine.129 This model had a heavy emphasis on mounted patrols, especially horse
mounted patrols. The date most often cited as the beginning of the British Gendarmerie in
Palestine is July 1, 1921 when news of the force was published in the Palestine Gazette.
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Churchill sought to fill the ranks of the Gendarmerie with locally recruited men who were
under the direction of British officers. However, he soon found out as the summer of 1921 gave
way to autumn that the force would need to be primarily comprised of Brits as locals were in
short supply. Further supporting this change was the de-escalation in Ireland. With the prospect
of Black and Tans and Auxiliaries soon to be out of work, Churchill saw the opportunity to
provide these men with a career in policing.
According to then Colonel Angus McNeil, the British Gendarmerie was established with
forty nine officers and 685 other ranks.130 These men were broken down into six companies,
each of which received four Ford Touring vehicles, four Ford Tenders, and four Lewis guns.131
McNeil goes on to write that seventy percent of the Gendarmerie was comprised of RIC regulars,
as well as the Black and Tans, while thirty percent were drawn from the Auxiliary division. The
men were relatively young averaging twenty-six years old. They also had more time in military
service than police service; the average constable had four years in the military opposed to one
year nine months as a police officer.132
For many of these constables the choice to join the Gendarmerie stemmed from the
impetus for so much of human action: money and fear. As peace drew closer in Ireland, many
constables knew the disbanding of their unit was not far off. Just as the Black and Tans offered a
lucrative job opportunity in 1920, the Gendarmerie presented the promise of continued
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employment.133 Employment options in both Ireland and England were slim. The primarily
agrarian economy of Ireland was hit especially hard in the post-World War I and postAnglo/Irish War economic slump. Agriculture was overwhelmingly the previous occupation of
constables. 134 Gannon has estimated that more than one third of the Irish-born RIC came from
agricultural households which no long needed their labor after the peace. One London-born
Black and Tan, Walter Harrison, insisted that job prospects even beyond agriculture were bleak
for those men who had only known work in the military and paramilitary police services. To men
like Harrison the Gendarmerie seemed like the obvious decision.135
The second aspect motivating men nearing the end of their tenure in Ireland was fear of
reprisal from a resentful Irish populace, and to a greater extent, violent nationalists who were
slow to forget the wrongs done to them by the RIC, the Black and Tans, and the Auxiliaries. As
Harrison remarked of the impending peace: “If one was a loyalist, that is, if one was non-Irish,
then one must get out.”136 A similar sentiment was shared by Douglas Duff in his memoir
Bailing Water with a Teaspoon.137 It is clear from several of these sources that if any of these
men, especially those who were English-born, were to stay in Ireland there would almost
certainly be some form of violent retribution. One former RIC constable from the Irish Free State
told author John Brewer in an oral history that many constables “just could not go home…They
had to go away because some men after going home were shot at for going home even though
they were disbanded and out of a job. A lot of them went to the Palestine Police.”138It is
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important to remember that the ambush/reprisal dynamic that existed between the police forces
in Ireland and Irish nationalists continued up to and beyond the peace agreement. Bearing all of
this in mind, it is no surprise that as constables faced their disbandment by immediately taking
the opportunity to sign up for the Gendarmerie.139
As it became clear that the ranks of the British Gendarmerie were to be filled with agents
of Empire who had earned a considerable and negative reputation in Ireland, there were many
who thought that the brutal nature of policing would be exported to Palestine. Kent Fedorowich
has documented well the fear that gave the British Government pause when considering
recruiting the Black and Tans. As he has written, the Black and Tans “…conjured up scenes of
barbarity and brutality to which none wanted to be linked.”140 This obviously created a problem
as the Irish security forces were to be the primary pool from which the Gendarmerie was
recruited. Churchill knew that there was no way to make the transition covertly. He decided that
the announcement of the Gendarmerie’s formation would be made without mentioning the
recruitment of the Black and Tans. To further avoid the connection between the Gendarmerie
and the Irish contingent, the announcement was made from London rather than Dublin. On
January 17, 1922, the official release stated only that units which were to be disbanded that year
would be recruited into the Gendarmerie. However, this attempt at misdirection did not succeed
as the Central News Agency in London revealed that the disbanded units were, in fact the
infamous Black and Tans.141
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The next step was to name a commandant to take control of the men recruited. The
proposed date of April 1st was approaching fast and after some deliberation it was decided that
the Boer War and First World War veteran, Col. Angus John McNeil, was a suitable candidate.
Aside from his previous military experience during the Boer War, his time in the First World
War allowed him to become well acquainted with Palestine and the region in general. McNeil
and his second-in-command, Major Gerald Foley, quickly began to sort through applications to
find the most qualified constables. Instrumental in assisting Foley and McNeil in selecting
recruits for the Gendarmerie was Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor. Tudor’s experience as
commander of all security forces in Ireland made him well qualified to find the best possible
recruits for service. However, Tudor’s association with the process only served to cement the
idea of Irish brutality being exported to Palestine. The same man in charge of all security forces
in Ireland was now helping to establish and shape the new Gendarmerie in Palestine. Moreover,
Tudor was named Inspector General of Police and Prisons only three months after the arrival of
the British Gendarmerie recruits in Palestine. This promotion put Tudor in charge of all security
forces in Palestine including the British Gendarmerie, the Palestine Gendarmerie, the Palestine
Police and any military units left in the country.142
To anyone looking at the situation of recruitment, which had been reported on by a
number of newspapers, it was not unreasonable to think that the tactics used by the Black and
Tans in Ireland would continue in Palestine.143 All of the men in charge of recruitment, Tudor,
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McNeil, and Foley, had far more experience serving as military officers than police officers.
Further, the reprisals carried out by the Black and Tans had taken place under Tudor’s overall
command. Public fears of the same kind of reprisals taking place in Palestine were perhaps,
initially, well justified. Despite these fears, the British Gendarmerie showed great restraint
during their service as will be shown in the next section.
The British Gendarmerie in Palestine
Of all the men who traveled to Palestine after the disbanding of the Black and Tans,
Douglas Duff is the only one who has left a full account of his time from Ireland to Palestine and
beyond. After accepting a position in the Gendarmerie, Duff visited his father who had been ill
and then proceeded on to Plymouth, to begin training at Fort Tregantle. Upon arrival the
quartermaster assigned Duff to ‘F’ Platoon where he was reunited with several men whom he
had served with in Ireland. The training did not seem to be of any challenge to Duff and the other
men who had already completed similar training while in Ireland. It was not long until their new
uniforms arrived. The reception of their new garb was less than exciting as Duff describes: “We
were dressed in khaki serge of a villainous war-time texture, not a single man had his clothes
fitting him, whilst we also wore black puttees and a Stetson wide-awake hat with a scarlet and
green pugaree, undoubtedly hats that had been made for men of the New Zealand forces…”144
Much in the same way that the Black and Tans had their uniforms cobbled together from a
variety of service items from throughout the Empire, the Gendarmerie now found themselves in
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a similar position. However, as Duff discovered later, this distinct look carried the same kind of
stigma into Palestine.145
Leading the men was a Brigadier-General who had served during the First World War in
Palestine and took very quickly and consistently to looking down upon his new group of men.146
Below him was a senior officer formerly of the RIC who Duff described as being well-liked, had
many years of service and was also frustrated by the General’s treatment of the recruits. The
adjunct was an officer of the Auxiliary who was not well liked. Duff recalled there were
desertions every day and a growing frustration among the men who had been doing this sort of
work for years. Duff brings up the dissatisfaction of being treated like a serviceman or a ‘raw
recruit’. There were other circumstances which further alienated the men from the BrigadierGeneral. For instance one rule laid down during their time at Fort Tregantle was that the men
were not allowed to leave the fort unless they were in uniform. Duff writes that this did not sit
well because the, “men were ashamed of being seen in the ill-fitting, ugly slops that we were
forced to wear.”147 According to Duff most of the men resented being treated like irresponsible
private soldiers after already having passed through training and also field experience in Ireland.
The training at Fort Tregantle seems to be more aptly described as a drilling of formations and a
rehashing of the training the men received in Ireland
Week after week, the men were told that a ship would soon come to take them to
Palestine. Finally on April 13, 1922, The City of Oxford arrived to carry the recruits off to a land
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from which some would not return.148 It was a small ship, cramped and unsuited for such a large
contingent of men. The circumstances of their transport did little to please those who felt they
were being treated like enlisted soldiers rather than civil policemen. Duff describes the men’s
dismay at their new lodging by writing, “our men were mainly of the officer class, used to fair
dealing and some consideration, and many were the angry murmurs when we saw what had been
prepared for us.”149After several days of poor conditions and continued insult from their
Commandant, there was essentially a mutiny aboard the ship. With all of the men brandishing
their pistols they took their case to the Commandant where the spokesman of the group said,
“May I also say, sir, that we are not troops, we are policemen, and Civil Servants and that we
resent being treated as though we were raw recruits. If we are handled properly there will be no
finer force in the world than ours, but we cannot stand much more of what we have had ever
since we joined.”150 Following this incident, the leadership relented, and for the most part, Duff
claims that the men felt that they were receiving some measure of the respect they deserved. 151
This incident shows something that became more clear throughout the voyage and also
during Duff’s time in Palestine; there was a real fear among the men as to whether or not they
would be treated as soldiers or as policemen. There are several times throughout Duff’s writings
when the Gendarmerie was used as a military rather than a police force. It is also clear that the
men took issue with these blurred lines. Duff recalled one man speaking about the Commandant,
“If that old man has his own way we shall be indistinguishable from a battalion of infantry, but if
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No. 2, the Assistant Commandant, is given a say, he will have us doing Constabulary duties.”152
The distinction here being that if the Commandant, a man who only had experience leading
soldiers as a Brigadier-General is left in command the men will be treated as soldiers. Yet, if the
former RIC officer is left in charge, he knew how to implement soldiers in a police setting.
Finally Palestine was within sight. At the end of April, Mount Carmel came into view.153
For Duff, thoughts of the Crusaders came to mind. He thought of the great kings and princes who
looked upon the same wind swept coasts.154 Duff references the Crusades several times
throughout his writing. It is clear that he does not see the British Gendarmerie as having the same
divine calling as the crusading kings of old. Still, it does seem that Duff sees his time in Palestine
as a sort of noble calling. Not necessarily to take and hold the Holy Land, but an expedition to
keep the peace in the same manner he saw himself and the other Black and Tans keeping peace
in Ireland.
Upon arrival the men were packed into old run-down barracks. The conditions were
extremely hot and the sleeping quarters were infested with insects and small animals. Duff was
in charge of messing food. The men were always on the verge of mutiny, even among each other.
Tensions continue to run high and animosity continued to grow toward their Commandant;
especially when he insisted on putting them in compromising positions. The most serious of
these situations was a day when the Commandant ordered the men on a parade drill after they
had all just received inoculations. According to regulations the men should have been resting. As
a result, half of the platoon passed out during the march.155 The Commandant’s contempt for the
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men clearly came out at this time as well. Duff recalled that he seemed confounded how highly
decorated the men were, mostly from their time in World War I. As he writes: “There were
dozens of Military Crosses, Distinguished Conduct Medals, Military Medals, a few D.S.O.’s and
every other decoration on the breasts of the men in the ranks, but it appeared strange to the
worthy ‘brass-hat,156 to see so many of these decorations on the tunics of men who were, from all
appearance, nothing but private soldiers.”157 The various awards did not change the General’s
opinion of the men. Especially when the men gave evasive and intentionally non-descript
answers when asked where they received the medals. It is clear from these incidents that not only
did the Commandant wish to make this a platoon of soldiers, but he also felt that these men were
little more than mercenaries. Brig. Gen. Angus McNeil did express worry that the Black and
Tans infamous reputation would lead to problems. Prior to their arrival he wrote that negative
propaganda was already “rife and the smallest incident was ridiculously magnified.”158
Despite the General’s hope for having a military regiment of his own design, the facilities
could not support ‘F’ Platoon and its men were redistributed. After the dissolution of ‘F’ Platoon,
Duff was sent to No. 5 Company and found himself fortunate to serve under a well-liked officer
by the name of Munro as Company Commander, and another agreeable man named ForbesSharp as company officer. Their new quarters were not much better than their former housing.
The heat and lack of ventilation led to a great deal of sickness. Several local pubs were closer to
the barracks than the nearest source of fresh water. This led to a severe lack of sobriety as Duff
describes, “It is not too much to say that there were very few sober men to be found inside the
Barracks after seven o’clock in the evening…”159 This excluded men who were on watch. Such
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men were committed to sobriety by a rigid form of ‘Barrack-room Court Martial’ where the men
themselves policed such behavior.
Their first call to action occurred in July 1922 in Haifa, when a group of Arabs had
gathered to protest the Mandate for Palestine. The crowd began to disperse as the order to ‘load’
and ‘take aim’ was given. Duff writes about their reputation, “It was quite enough, the Arabs had
heard about us and knew what manner of men we were; there had been a great deal of judicious
propaganda from District Officers, telling them what our reputation had been in Ireland.”160 Here
we see the first instance where the colonial police actions in Ireland had some kind of effect in
Palestine. Where a crowd may have persisted at the threat of fire, this crowd knew that these
particular men behind the rifles had a history of violence against civilians. Any threat made by
this group had to be taken seriously. This is also the pattern of containing disturbance that
occurred throughout the majority of the Mandate years. Large crowds often gathered in protest,
most often against Jewish immigration, and the firm, but measured police response diffused the
situation, in most cases.
It was during this time that Duff describes Jews moving into Palestine. Everyday more
and more makeshift tents and hovels sprang up. With this influx came an increase in highway
robberies, and murders. One such instance took place as they served as police escorts to a
treasury official along the route to the Government Headquarters in Nablus during which they
came under fire from seventy to one-hundred Arabs. They were able to hold off the attack long
enough for a detachment of men to ride ahead to Nablus and bring reinforcements. Reflecting
upon this and their other duties such as patrolling the Jordan fordes at nighttime, Duff began to
realize that their impact in the region had become similar to their impact in Ireland. As he
160

Duff, Sword for Hire, 112.

58

recounts, “…it was not long before the Stetson hat caused as much alarm, and to the law-abiding
gave as much sense of security as the dark-green tunic had done in other days in Ireland.”161 This
again supports the idea that Duff thought that he and his men were there for a noble cause. It
seems that keeping the peace and serving justice did in fact matter to him. In Ireland, Duff
thought that they were there to restore order, and again in Palestine the same brand of justice was
needed.
Even though it appears that the reputation of the Irish contingent had followed them into
the Mandate, the alleged behavior did not. The kind of crime Duff and the Gendarmerie were
helping to combat was largely common offenses and immigration control. The remainder of
Duff’s account regarding the Gendarmerie does not note any serious attacks made against the
police, nor does it recount violence against either Jews or Arabs. Also, there were no large-scale
uprisings or protests like those seen in the early 1920s. They were not under constant threat from
nationalist rebels and thus the ambush/reprisal dynamic that existed in Ireland did not occur in
Palestine. From Duff’s experience it is clear that there was some continuation of violence, but it
did not manifest in the same way that it had in Ireland. The Gendarmes were almost always
acting in a manner that worked towards a resolution that would not breed further outrage. Also,
the Gendarmerie often only ran into trouble when trying to protect Jewish settlers or dealing with
smugglers and criminals. They did not provoke the same outright acts of ‘outrage’ as the security
forces in Ireland. This seems to suggest that the nature of violence in Ireland, while similar, was
The fact remains however, the initial fears of the media, and McNeil himself, never materialized.
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This is all the more important when considering the fact that in 1926 the Gendarmerie was
disbanded and its men were absorbed into the Palestine Police.
The Fall of the Gendarmerie, the Rise of the Palestine Police
Despite the known efficiency of the Gendarmerie, in early 1925 it seemed as though their
days were numbered. The Gendarmerie and other security forces may have been too effective in
keeping the peace as the British Government could not find a reason to justify having two
separate forces in the Gendarmerie and the Palestine Police Force. From April 1925 until
February 1926 a discussion continued in Parliament about how to keep down the cost of security
forces. In the end the decision was made to disband both the British and Palestine
Gendarmerie.162 It was hoped that by introducing this significant group of well-trained Brits into
the Palestine Police a kind of ‘British discipline’ would be instilled.
On April 1st 1926 nearly half of the men who were in the British Gendarmerie were
absorbed into the British section of the Palestine Police. At the time, the Palestine Police Force
consisted of seventy eight officers and 1059 other ranks. With the addition of the Gendarmerie
two more officers were added and the force gained the advantage of two-hundred-ninety
mounted units as well as twenty-eight foot police. There were however casualties to the merger
as Angus McNeil was not given command and made the decision to pass into retirement in
Galilee. Meanwhile, those in the Palestine Gendarmerie was transformed into the Trans-Jordan
Frontier Force. In this capacity they would continue to be a primarily mounted unit responsible
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for patrolling the border of the mandate. Additionally, they were placed under the authority of
the military and thus the War Office.163
Moving forward, with the incorporation of the British Gendarmerie the primary concern
of the Palestine Police was to keep the peace in the rural areas surrounding the major cities. This
task was made more difficult due to the dissolution of the Palestine Gendarmerie. Previously, the
Palestine Gendarmerie had been responsible for patrolling the frontier which included borders
with Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. With the Palestine Gendarmerie gone, the task of
controlling these rural outskirts, along with the smuggling and illegal immigration problems that
came with them, fell to Commandant A.S. Mavrogordato and his Palestine Police.164
New responsibilities were not the only challenge facing the force. The new British
contingent had to be configured into a system that had already been working quite well. The
Palestinian section of the force was already skilled in the traditional law and order duties of the
police. Jack Binsley, a constable who joined the Palestine Police Force several years after the
dissolution of the Gendarmerie claimed that the local police, “did all the real police work,
investigation and prosecution while the British section were primarily for prevention and any
military action that should be needed.”165 He went on say that the British men were usually
charged with keeping the diary of the day’s events while, “all crime was referred to the local
police and futile entries were made in the dairy…”166 The British section was then seen as a sort
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of ‘rough and tumble’ group that could be used for riot control. Horne writes that they, “applied
themselves to the serious business of mastering weaponry, drill and dealing with violent crowds.
They hardly touched training in law or police duty but instead considered the quickest way to
reach a scene of trouble on a ‘fire brigade’ basis.”167 It is this lack of training, as well as a lack of
knowledge of the locality that seems to be the reason for the ‘division of labor’ amongst that
British and local constables. As Constable J.E. Davies recalled of the manner in which the force
was distributed,
The Main body of the British Section was stationed at Mount Scopus, Jerusalem,
and detachments of about thirty rank and file in the districts as follows:--At Haifa,
which would deal with emergencies up to the northern frontier. The men were
billeted at Bat Galim. At Nablus, for the region of Samaria, these men were
billeted in the old Turkish Fort: and at Sarafand until 1927 when the men were
moved into Jaffa, which would deal with all emergencies from just north of Tel
Aviv down to Rafa’a on the Egyptian border. But in the event of serious trouble,
local District Headquarters could be reinforced with men from Mount Scopus.168

Wishing to make his men into more than just a riot squad, the Commander of the British
Section Major J. Munro sought to establish a training program aimed at making real policemen
out of the former Gendarmes. Aspects of the program were physically severe and sought to weed
out any recruits who were not fit for duty. This was important as there was an increasingly high
rate of turnover as the years went on.169 Munro forced his men to take larger shares of patrol in
the cities and get a feel for what the people were like. This prompted many policemen to take an
interest in learning Hebrew or Arabic. 170
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All of these efforts certainly strengthened the force and brought the British and
Palestinians closer together. Still, the training and duties performed by the men seemed to be
aimed at preparing them for large-scale uprisings, not common police work. Even to that end,
they were ill-prepared for the trials to come. The period of 1926 to 1929 was and would prove to
be the most peaceful years of the Palestine Mandate’s history. The Palestine Police took
advantage of that time to hone their skills as real policemen, while still maintaining the ability to
handle a ‘real emergency’.171 This skill in particular, as will be shown in the next section, would
be most useful in the force’s immediate future.
...
As it has been shown, upon arrival into the Mandate the situation into which the British
Gendarmerie were placed was an unenviable one. Their former work as The Black and Tans and
Auxiliaries earned them a reputation for brutal tactics and bad behavior. Many wondered if this
same brand of policing was going to be exported to Palestine. Also, these men were entering into
a battle between competing nationalist and religious goals. Jewish immigrants were flooding into
the Mandate, and Arabs living in the region perceived the threat of being pushed into an
economic and territorial periphery.
Despite the challenges facing the British Gendarmerie, they managed, to some extent, to
overcome them. Their bloody reputation of Ireland did not follow them very far into the
Mandate. In fact, the Irish security forces’ time in the Palestine Mandate led to the most peaceful
years of the Mandate’s history. This chapter has charted the transition of the security forces from
Ireland into the Palestine Mandate. It has examined the situation in the Middle East during and

The phrase ‘real policemen’ is referring to the British contingent of the Palestine Police growing to take part in
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after the First World War as it pertains to the Palestine Mandate. It has also offered an account of
policing in the Mandate including: the establishment of the Palestine Police, the recruitment of
the Irish security forces into the British Gendarmerie, and finally their training and activities
during the Mandate, Lastly, an account of the disbanding of the British Gendarmerie and
absorption into the Palestine Police has been discussed an analyzed. This has all been done to
demonstrate how the security forces from Ireland evolved beyond the violent tactics that were
implemented prior to their transition into the Mandate.
Certainly the case can be made that some violence was used to keep control of region.
However, what set the British Gendarmerie and eventually the Palestine Police apart from the
security forces from Ireland was a commitment to augment their training. Especially near the end
of the decade when Major Munro began to implement new training programs aimed at
integrating the Brits into the community and making them more familiar with the duties of a
traditional policeman.

64

Chapter III: The Palestine Police: Revolt and Reform
With the incorporation of the British Gendarmerie into the Palestine Police, the force
became a more formidable and competent entity. However, the decade of relative calm that the
security forces had enjoyed was about to end. Nationalist tensions, which had been building for
years were on a collision course. Of course, these tensions were not just rooted in ideas of
nationalism, but also by religious fervor, inflamed by leaders such as the Grand Mufti, Haj Amin
Husseini. What this all meant for the Palestine Police was a time when the effectiveness of the
force was put to the test.
It is the argument of this chapter that the 1930s represent a time when the Palestine Police
faced a number of new threats and challenges to which they responded effectively. Starting in
1929 with the Wailing Wall Incident, the force experienced a period of ‘riot and reform’. Put
simply, the force was faced to three significant trials throughout the decade: the 1929 Massacre,
the 1933 Riots, and finally the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. In each case the force was tested to
retain control and each case saw a successively increased measure of success. Regardless,
following each incident, there came a time of reform whereby the force attempted to adapt to the
ever-changing landscape of threats. By the end of the decade not only was the Palestine Police
Force facing threats of insurrection from Arab gangs, but from Jewish gangs as well.172 To
support this argument, each incident or period will be discussed and analyzed with a focus on the
events the force faced and how it responded after the fact.

The Jewish and Arab ‘gangs’ were initially relatively disorganized and disruptions early on in the decade were
equally disorganized. However, as the decade progressed, both became increasingly more organized. As such,
attacks between Arabs and Jews, as well as against British forces became more organized and deadly.
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Riot of 1929
What some refer to as the 1929 Massacres, also known as the Arab Riot of 1929, and the
Wailing Wall Incident, were the first major ‘battle’ that the Palestine Police faced and marks the
beginning of a period of ever-increasing violence in the region. Centered around the continuing
dispute between Arabs and Jews over rights to the Western Wall, the riots resulted in violent
Arab attacks on Jews and their property.173 Between August 23rd and 29th there was considerable
loss of life and injury. While dealing with the violence the Palestine Police received and doled
out their fair share of violence. This section attempts to explain the greatest test the Palestine
Police had faced up to this point.
The dispute over the Western Wall had been ongoing long before the British assumed
responsibility over Palestine. However, throughout the early twentieth century things had
remained relatively peaceful. Jews were not permitted to establish any kind of permanent
presence at the wall. This meant that starting in 1912, while still under Ottoman rule, Jews were
not allowed to bring anything such as chairs or screens to the wall. As Barnet Litvinoff wrote in
the forward to a collection of letters by Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann, “since the days of
Turkish rule, the worshippers had been forbidden to erect a screen to bring chairs, and the British
authorities had been meticulous in maintaining the status quo.”174 By preventing Jews from
bringing any traditional prayer-related items to the Wall it prevented them from staking any kind

The ‘Wailing Wall’, ‘Western Wall’, or ‘KaKotel HaMa’ariv’ as Jews commonly refer to it is the last remnant of
the third temple built by King Herod the Great, which was destroyed in 70 AD. It is likely built on top of the western
most wall of the temple built by the King of Israel, Solomon. As such the wall is that last remaining connection to
the ancient homeland of the Jews. However, the spot is just as important to Muslims. The Wailing Wall is
supposedly the spot where the prophet Mohammad ascended into heaven. As such this site is a major point of
contention between the two religions. Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British
Mandate, trans. Ham Watzman (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999), 301-306.
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of permanent claim to the Wall. This remained the situation through the First World War and
into the mandate period even as more Jewish settlers began to pour into the region. While there
were instances throughout the 1920s of Jews bringing chairs and benches for the elderly to sit
upon while they prayed, the status quo was held intact.
The Day of Atonement or Yom Kippur fell on September 24th in 1928. On the 23rd a
Jewish rabbi erected a screen at the Wall for the following day’s services. This of course angered
the Arab population and Douglas Duff, who was stationed in the city, was ordered to remove the
screen. Duff managed to convince the District Commissioner to let him speak with the Rabbi
Noah, the Beadle of the Wailing Wall, before removing the screen. This Commissioner agreed
and accompanied Duff to talk to the Rabbi. Understanding Duff’s concern the Rabbi agreed that
the screen would have to come down, but could not do anything at the moment because the sun
had already set and the traditional feast had begun. Seeking to find an amicable agreement, the
Commissioner gave the Rabbi until seven o’ clock the next morning to remove the screen. At six
o’ clock the next morning the Rabbi arrived at Duff’s quarters begging for an extension until
nine. However, this extension was not in Duff’s power to grant and the Rabbi was forced to take
his case to the Commissioner. Rabbi Noah returned at 6:30 in the morning with a grant for
extension. As Duff writes, “I did not realize the importance of the case, no one did at the
time…”175 Duff dispatched one of his subordinates to see if the screen had been removed,
expecting that Rabbi Noah had complied with the order. Yet to Duff’s surprise the man returned
“a few minutes later, with his tunic hanging in rags and his face scratched and bleeding, saying
that he had been attacked by a number of Jewish women, who had prevented him from removing
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the screen.”176 Eventually, Duff’s men were able to remove the screen, but not without inflaming
the crowd of highly religious Jews who saw the image of British Police ripping apart a religious
item on one of their highest of holy days. Further, as Duff recounts, “…Arabs by the thousand
were beginning to throng into the city, and, ominously enough, they all carried heavy clubs,
whilst most had daggers in their waist-cloths.”177 The situation did not escalate into a full on riot,
but it did serve to turn the Jewish population squarely against the security forces, and especially
against Duff himself.
There is perhaps one figure who did more than any other to ensure that the peace which
had existed between Arabs and Jews for most of the 1920s would not last: The Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem, Haj Amin Husseini.178 In 1928 he presided over an Islamic Congress held in
Jerusalem to discuss the question of the Wailing Wall. The result of this congress was the
decision to form groups to defend the Mosque of Omar. This would eventually play a role in
1929 Massacres.179 Duff mentions the al-Husseini family and the Grand Mufti while describing
the nature of Arab-Jewish relations,
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Perhaps I had best explain the situation as it was, and is, in Palestine. The native
Palestinians are mainly Moslems, followers of the Prophet Mohammed. They are
divided, politically, into two parties, the followers of the Husseini factions,
headed by the Grand Mufti, Haj Mani Husseini, and those who adhere to the
Nashahivi party, whose leader is Ragheb Bey el Nashahibi, for many years Mayor
of Jerusalem. The Husseinis are extremists—nationalists—bitterly opposed to
both British and Jews. The Nashashibis are, numerically, far stronger and might
be called the Moderates, for they are willing to accept an understanding with both
Britain and the Zionists.180

Christopher Sykes claims that Arab-Jewish relations had been relatively amiable, but, “under the
Mufti’s influence this was all changed. The enemy was the Jewish people. To be a Jew was in
itself an offence. Arab nationalism adopted anti-Semitism on the coarsest European model.”181
The events of Yom Kippur served as a prelude to the riots that ensued the following
summer. Duff notes the tension at the time between the two events and also the lack of a British
imperial presence beyond the Palestine Police: “There was no force in the country. No Imperial
troops were to be found in the whole length and breadth of the Holy Land…”182 Duff and other
officials knew it was only a matter of time before uncontrollable violence erupted between the
two sides. Tensions were high and border forces were doing their best, but could not stop the
smuggling of arms into the region. Tensions continued to build until the following summer.
Nobody in the high command raised alarm within the British Government about the security
problem at hand. The situation was seen as ‘under control’. High Commissioner John
Chancellor, felt comfortable enough at the time to leave on holiday in June. Commandant
Movrogordato, who had presided over the dissolution of the Gendarmeries and lack of military
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support in the region, soon followed suit. None have described the situation better than Edward
Horne: “…There was to unfold in Palestine a situation worse than any Homeric tragedy with the
two principal actors off stage.”183 By the end of summer 1929 things had reached a breaking
point.
Duff claims that the Riots of 1929 began with the most innocuous of events; a young boy
kicking a ball over a wall. The story goes that in the Mustashfa Quarter of Jerusalem, a Jewish
boy accidently kicked a ball over a wall where a young Arab girl was watching her father’s
tomato crop. The girl hid the ball from the boy under her skirts and refused to give it back. The
boy tried to take the ball back and the girl screamed. A group of Arab children ran to the girl’s
aid and the boy’s playmates ran to his. Soon neighbors from the Jewish community and Arabs
from the road adjacent to the field were coming to investigate. It wasn’t long until a fight broke
out. When the dust had settled a young Jewish man’s injuries were so severe he was taken to a
hospital where he later died. Duff tells us that the next day the young man’s countrymen decided
to bury him “and stated their intention of carrying the corpse through the Jaffa Gate, down past
the Moslem quarters and so to the cemetery at Silwan.” Waiting at the gate was a ‘threatening
crowd of Arabs’ ready to meet them. This was the beginning of what Duff called ‘the Rising’. 184
Arab crowds began to pour into the city brandishing a number of weapons from stones to
automatic pistols. “Within an hour firing was general throughout the Holy City, bombs were
thrown, and motor-cars, filled with young town-Arabs armed with automatic pistols, were
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careering through the streets of Jewish suburbs firing at all passers-by.”185 Duff also recounts
perhaps the greatest contributing factor to the 1929 Massacre: rumors. Throughout the two days
of bloodshed one of the most common reoccurrences was the propagation of rumors. Word
quickly spread that Jews were seizing the ‘great Moslem sanctuaries in the Temple area.’ This
was of course not true, but it was sufficient to provoke young Arabs from surrounding villages to
storm the city.
While the entire Mandate experienced disturbances on some scale, the city of Hebron
played host to perhaps the most gruesome scenes of the massacre. On 17 August 1929 at 9:30
PM Assistant District Superintendent Raymond Cafferata received a message from Jerusalem
that a stabbing had occurred and a large-scale disruption could erupt soon.186 Despite what was
going on in Jerusalem, Cafferata received assurance from Arab leader Sheikh Amin Jabari that
things would remain peaceful in Hebron. It was reasonable to think that the Sheikh’s word would
hold true as Arab-Jewish relations in Hebron were good. As Cafferata’s report reads: “The
Jewish attitude was that they had lived in Hebron for generations; that they were known to the
Arabs well and that they were the best of friends.”187 Cafferata remained vigilant over the next
several days and continued to check in with both Jewish and Arab notables to make sure that no
trouble was stirring.
Up to midday Friday the 23rd, the situation remained quiet; however this peaceful
morning was not to last much longer. At 1:45 PM, Jerusalem was under attack and the request
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for aid went out from the undermanned Jerusalem post. Two hours later, Cafferata posted
constables on the incoming road from Jerusalem to prevent any malcontents from spreading the
riot to Hebron. Despite Cafferata’s attempts, word began to spread rapidly through the city and
many Arabs began to gather and wished to march on Jerusalem. Cafferata’s attempts to disperse
the crowd and dissuade them from mounting busses to Jerusalem were in vain. The situation
quickly grew out of hand as a crowd of seven hundred grew ever more restless and began to
attack Jewish property in Hebron. In short order Cafferata gathered his eight mounted units and
attempted to rush Jews to safety and disperse the crowds. They were successful in their mission,
however an offshoot of the crowd made its way north to the Talmudie School where one Jewish
man was stabbed to death and another was wounded. By 6:00 PM the streets of Hebron were
again quiet and Cafferata had to figure out how to keep them that way.
The most pressing issue now was to plan for the young Jewish student’s funeral.
Cafferata knew that it was the funeral of a young Jewish boy that led to the outbreak of violence
in Jerusalem and he didn’t want that to happen in Hebron. Cafferata told the Rabbi Epstein to
make arrangements for the dead student and that the funeral would take place either early in the
morning or late at night with a limit of six mourners, in order to reduce the chance of Arab
trouble. Further, Cafferata ordered all Jews to stay indoors and away from their windows.
Mukhtars of Hebron were ordered to control their own people.188 While dealing with the
potentially explosive issue of the Jewish funeral, Mukhtars arrived from Dura at 9:00 PM under
the false presumption that “Arabs were being slaughtered in Hebron and Jerusalem and that they
must come in and fight, that the Mufti wanted them and would fine them unless they did so.”189
188

Mukhtars are political leaders within a community or village often chosen to represent the village in official
matters.
189
Report by Mr. R.O. Cafferata, A.D.S.P., Hebron, 23 rd and 24th August, 1929. Cafferata Papers GB165-0044
(MECA), Leverarch file 1.

72

Fortunately for Cafferata and the other Palestine Police the Mukhtars had dissuaded the people
from running blindly into battle and had come to speak with the police themselves.
Despite the efforts of the Palestine Police, Jewish leaders, and the Arab Mukhtars,
inflammatory speeches made by the Mufti and misinformation proved too great and by 8:15 AM
the next morning, 24 August, 1929, crowds began to form. Armed with stones, the rioters began
to attack Jewish homes and Jewish property. Cafferata brought up all available mounted units
from his reserve and armed them with rifles. Several different homes were being attacked and
Cafferata attempted to defend one, which the mob had surrounded. He recounts the result: “I did
all in my power to protect the two Jews by surrounding them with mounted men but the mob
surged round and stoned them to death within two minutes.”190 Cafferata began to shoot into the
mob with his revolver until he fell from his horse and was forced to run for the road under a hail
of stones. Luckily for Cafferata he was able to make his way to the barracks and the crowds
began to disperse and make their way onto busses headed to Jerusalem.
The exodus to Jerusalem meant that much of the violent crowd inhabiting the northern
part of Hebron was no longer a threat, however there was still a serious threat to the Jewish
population in the southern part of town known as the ‘Ghetto’. It was during the battle for this
part of Hebron that Cafferata recounts one of the most troubling pieces of information. While in
a shoot-out he recalled:
On hearing screams I went up a sort of tunnel passage and saw an Arab in the act
of cutting off a child’s head with a sword, he had already hit him and was having
another cut but on seeing me he tried to aim the stoke at me but missed; he was
practically on the muzzle of my rifle. I shot him low in the groin. Behind him was
a Jewish woman smothered in blood with a man I recognized as a police constable
named Issa Sherrif from Jaffa in mufti. He was standing over the woman with a
190
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dagger in his hand. He saw me and bolted into a room close by and tried to shut
me out – shouting (in Arabic) “Your Honour, I am a Policeman”. 191

This passage is disturbing first for the brutality shown toward a child, but also for the revelation
of police complicity in the crime. The fact that a member of the Palestine Police Force had left
his own district and was participating in the riots is something that differs from Duff’s
experience in Jerusalem, but speaks to the larger problem the force faced in the years to come.
The rioting continued until about 1:00 PM when the crowds began to dissipate. By that
point the remaining Jewish population had been moved to secure barracks or were in hiding with
Arab friends.192 By the end of the day the rioting had subsided throughout the Mandate. British
troops arrived the next day including Marines from the HMS Sussex and seven-hundred men
from the South Staffordshire Regiment entered in Jaffa and Tel Aviv.193 Meanwhile the RAF
was patrolling the Syrian border with Brig. Gen. W.G.S. Dobbie in command of British troops to
restore order. 194
As it has already been said, the rumors and incendiary speech propagated by the Grand
Mufti certainly served to not only create a conducive environment for insurrection, but also to
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support its continuation once it had started. However, Douglas Duff claims in his memoir
another contributing factor as to why Hebron played host to such ghastly scenes,
Most of the surrounding countryside was in debt to the Hebron Jewish
merchants, and as soon as they had been slaughtered, their officers and houses
were pillaged, and all promissory-notes and ledgers were burnt…195

Cafferata made no such claim either in his official report or in his private notes, however Duff’s
claim would explain the particularly brutal nature of the Hebron massacre.
In the aftermath of the massacre Raymond Cafferata emerged as a hero. In a number of
British newspapers he was hailed as, ‘The Man of Lead’.196 These articles claimed he was
unaided in the defense of Jewish lives, with the exception of the Daily Courier, which hit closer
to the truth by writing, ‘almost unaided’.197 Still, Cafferata’s story is rather exceptional and for
his service to the Jewish community his name was inscribed in the Golden Book of the Jewish
National Fund. In this book are enrolled the names of people who have been distinguished by
their acts for the cause of Zionism.198
By the end of August, the total number of dead was set at one-hundred eighty-six.
Meanwhile, the number of those in Palestine who were not mortally wounded reached threehundred-fifteen. The following table gives the total breakdown of casualties as they were
reported to the House of Commons.
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1929 Massacre Casualties
Killed or died of wounds:
Moslems
Christians
Jews
Wounded in hospital:
Moslems
Christians
Jews

83
4
109
122
10
183

Source: HC Deb 06 November 1929 vol 231 cc1018-9

In the wake of the 1929 Massacre, Lord Balfour felt the need to reiterate his declaration
for the establishment of a Jewish homeland. The Daily News and Westminster Gazette quoted
Balfour as declaring, “The British Empire and all the powers with whom it has been closely
associated, have solemnly declared their intention of again rendering Palestine the national home
of the Jewish people. See that pledge has been given. Depend upon it, it is not going to be
withdrawn.”199 The confirmation of the Balfour Declaration surely seemed like a natural thing to
do following the massacre of so many Jews. Further, Chaim Weissman wrote to Balfour after the
Massacre stating, “I should greatly appreciate if Your Excellency would kindly convey to special
constables in Jerusalem our most cordial thanks their devoted services in protection of Jewish
population.”200 However, this did little to quell the anger of an Arab population which was
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spurred to action over growing religious tension and the British Government’s insistence on not
controlling the influx of Jewish immigrants.
For the Palestine Police the 1929 Massacre revealed all of their glaring inadequacies.
While considerable and commendable efforts were made throughout the latter half of the 1920s
to adapt to the ever-shifting sands within the Mandate, the events of late August proved too great
for anyone to anticipate. The British and Palestine governments had grown complacent in the
years of peace and thus allowed for the two errors which enabled the massacre to take place: an
inadequate garrison of military troops and a faltering numbers within the Palestine Police Force.
The Palestine Police had seen a significant drop in recruitment in the years following the
dissolution of the British Gendarmerie and with the years of peace, no real effort had been made
to bring their numbers up. Finally, when trouble did begin and the force was overwhelmed, there
was no military garrison to call upon for support. Over the next several years the Government
and the Police performed a serious overhaul of how it planned to secure the Holy Land. This
reform could not be performed fast enough as the next serious test of the Palestine Police was
only three short years away.
Post-1929 Reform
Following the Riots of 1929 it was clear to both the British and Palestine Governments
that the problems of Jewish immigration and the rise of Arab nationalism could not be ignored.
Also, there were questions surrounding the effectiveness of the Palestine Police Force. As
debates from the House of Commons show, both the money being spent on security, as well as
the inadequate number of constables was partially to blame. MP, Lt.-Commander Joseph
Kenworthy went so far as to ask: “Is it not a fact that no troops would have been required if the
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late Government had not reduced the police forces?”201 This is a matter for debate, but what is
clear is that spending had gone from £ 834,319 in 1924 to £ 244,374 in 1928. 202 This drop in
spending may have been sufficient for the halcyon days of the 1920s, but for the wars to come
such a meager budget would simply not do.203
The Shaw Commission, headed by Sir Walter Shaw was assembled to investigate the
massacre of August 1929. The commission’s findings were released in March of 1930 and
suggested that the massacre was the latent result of British policy toward Jewish immigration
after the First World War. The uninhibited influx of Jews into the region only served to
continually strain relations between Jews, Arabs, and the British.204 Coupled with a rise in Arab
nationalism, the Western Wall incident served only as a spark to set off the powder keg. The
Shaw Commission gave way to a second report by Sir John Hope Simpson known as The Report
on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development. This report made the recommendation that
Jewish immigration into the Mandate be halted. Hope Simpson came to that conclusion by
presenting the negative impact land development initiated by the Jewish National Fund had on
Arabs. 205 Hope Simpson saw Arab exclusion from economic and agricultural opportunities in
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the region as a primary cause for widespread unrest. The solution, according to the report, was to
limit Jewish immigration into Palestine.206
These reports are important for two reasons; first, they offer an accurate analysis of the
situation within the Mandate. Throughout the 1920s, tensions simmered beneath the surface, but
the security forces were able to manage them. Following the dissolution of the British
Gendarmerie, Jewish immigration continued to rise and so too did Jewish-Arab tensions. Jewish
immigrants and The Jewish National Fund began to purchase land at an ever increasing rate, thus
pushing many Arabs into an economic periphery. The second important outcome of these reports
was a reconceptualization of the Palestine Police. Both reports suggested that the composition
and duties of the police were hindering them from keeping the peace. The Hope Simpson Report
made the argument that immigration and illegal immigration control both fell under the
responsibility of the police. This was reported to be too much for the security forces to handle on
top of their other duties.207 Meanwhile, the Shaw Commission suggested that British officers of
the Palestine Police were the only ones who kept the 1929 Massacre under any kind of control
and Palestinian officers failed to do their duty because of religious and political sentiments.208
Perhaps the most important result of all of this, as far as the police were concerned, was
the involvement of Herbert Dowbiggin. Dowbiggin had previously been Inspector General of
Police in Ceylon. He had also been called in to assess police forces elsewhere in the Empire
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including Northern Rhodesia and Cyprus. With Dowbiggin came yet another report. However,
this report was specific to the reorganization and improvement of the Palestine Police.
Dowbiggin made very clear what he thought was working and what he thought needed to be
changed. Dowbiggin’s report called for many modifications within the force including an
increase in British Officers, an increase in Arabic/Hebrew literacy for officers, additional
Palestinian and British Magistrates, and most importantly to him a new training school at Tel
Pioth. These changes represented Dowbiggin’s overarching assessment that the police in
Palestine were doing the best they could, but were missing key elements to make them a more
effective force. One area that Dowbiggin emphasized was the importance of leadership:
The officers themselves must receive constant instruction in order that they may
make the instruction of their men progressive. The instruction of the officers must
come from the Commandant. The future of the Force depends largely on the
officers, both British and Palestinian. During the next twenty years it will depend
to a great extent on the British officers. During those twenty years the Palestinian
officers will have the benefit of working with the British officers and British
police in large numbers and if a sound system of training for both British and
Palestinian officers is laid down the Palestinian officers in twenty years’ time
should be able to stand very much more on their own feet than they are able to do
to-day.209

Here we see the suggestion that the leadership of the police was inadequate. Dowbiggin
considered the Commandant at the time, Mavrogordato, to be a man who possessed abilities
commensurate with a subordinate officer or a commanding officer.210 However, for all the
qualities that Dowbiggin admired in Mavrogordato he thought that he was still lacking in certain
areas. For Dowbiggin the Commandant should have, above all else, initiative and vision. This
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idea of initiative and vision ties into Dowbiggin’s larger notion of the Commandant as a trainer
of men. “While his subordinates are carrying out their daily duties, the Officer Commanding
must be thinking ‘one ahead’. As the main duty of every Police Officer is to prevent crime, so
the main duty of the Head of the Force is to prevent trouble.”211 According to Dowbiggin, the
events of August 1929 could have been prevented or mitigated by a commander with greater
foresight, moreover he felt Mavrogordato did not have the necessary ability or training to carry
out the reforms that were needed.
Jack Binsley has written of this time period in his memoirs. He recalled that
“Mavrogordata was a popular jovial socialite who enjoyed life, but who was more concerned
about social acceptability than the efficiency of his police force.”212 To Binsley, the proof of
Mavrogordato’s inefficiency was in the lack of real police work being done by British
constables, as well as “the large number of Britishers leaving the force on completion of their
short contract.” 213 For many of these men, the Palestine Police was meant to be their career, but
according to Binsley, they had become disillusioned by the lack of interest in their training and
welfare.214 Mavrogordato had been in command for over nine years and was already due for
departure and so the decision was made on May 8, 1931 to replace Mavrogordato with his
deputy, Alan Saunders, who served as Acting Commandant until a permanent replacement could
be found.215 Saunders was relieved on July 16, 1931 by Roy Godfrey Bullen Spicer.
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Spicer had been Commissioner of Police in Kenya since 1925 and was a protégé of
Dowbiggin in Ceylon before that.216 He was a shot of fresh blood into the arm of the Palestine
Police. Spicer was described as a hard man with a will of iron. He took to implementing as many
of Dowbiggin’s suggestions as he could with remarkable zeal. The Palestine Police would no
longer resemble the model established by the Gendarmerie, characterized largely as riot
controllers. Instead, the police were now charged with mounted patrol and traffic control in
addition to being an expert riot squad. This was done in a fashion which promoted integration.
Where British and Palestinian officers were kept separate before, Spicer ordered all men to work
together. As Horne writes, “it bred a new police spirit in the British section, it stiffened the
Palestinian personnel and made them much more resolute and finally it led to a greater
understanding between all races in the force and the morale and efficiency of the men rose
accordingly.”217 This step of bringing the different contingents together changed the composition
and nature of the police. The likelihood of Arab or Jewish officers being complicit in a crime of
their own people was then less likely.
The integration of British, Jewish, and Arab policemen was quite important in the wake
of the 1929 Massacre where many of the Palestinian police were seen as unreliable. Spicer
sought to bring the force together through forcing men to work and share duties and also
incetivizing language proficiency among British constables. Binsley writes of these efforts: “My
work was quite interesting and I had some nice Arab police to work with so, rarely speaking
English at work, I improved my Arabic to the extent that I was able to pass a higher Arabic
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police exam named Regular Arabic.”218 Binsley goes on to note that knowledge of the native
languages was encouraged by periodic examinations in both Arabic and Hebrew, which allowed
pay increases. Because of this examination the prospect of making a career in the force now
seemed much more attractive and Binsley committed to learning Hebrew on top of Arabic.219
This incentive encouraged closer relations among policemen, but also had the added benefit of
making British constables more accessible to the people whom they were policing.
Spicer was also dealing with men who were not drawn from former military service. Men
now needed more extensive training in the military drill that was already known to exservicemen. Binsley writes of the new civilians recruited that, “they had three months training,
needing more drill, musketry and PT. They were also taught police work, some law and a little
Arabic, so they had a great advantage over us, who were sent out to do police work with no
training.”220 Having entered the force a little more than a year before these reforms took place,
Binsley clearly thought that these new recruits, having received enhanced ‘police’ training, had
an advantage despite their lack of military training. However, the men who had already been
trained were also receiving new forms of training. “Our new Inspector General was now making
progress in creating a more efficient British Section…We each received a Police Manual, which,
in simple form, contained valuable information on what an efficient police constable should
know.”221
Dowbiggin saw Spicer as the sort of man that was necessary to lead the Palestine Police
in their reform and Spicer did indeed possess a vital energy, initiative, and vision which he tried
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to instill in his own men. As Spicer began to initiate reform, there were still sporadic bouts of
violence which were quelled handily by the police. We see the first real proof of improvement in
the Annual Administrative Report of 1932. This report was filed after Spicer had been in charge
for just over a year and a half and certainly addressed some of the prime issues cited by
Dowbiggin. For instance, the faltering numbers were brought up over the course of two years.
Although the scheduled force strength was set at 2,332 Spicer was only able to claim 2,306.222
Still, this was a great improvement.
When it came to rates of murder in Palestine there was a steady decrease as shown by the
following chart:
Murder Rate in Palestine
Year

Number of Murders

1928

188

1929

178

1930

126

1931

119

1932

119

Source: R.G. B. Spicer, Annual Administrative Report 1932, in Faraday Papers GB 165-0101, (MECA).

This decrease in murders is considerable given the continued rise in population. Spicer himself
was quite satisfied with this outcome:
An increase in crime in this territory must, of necessity, be expected with the
growth of population, and with the rapid expansion of the urban areas. The key
note to police success in keeping it within a reasonable figure will be, in my
opinion, the prevention of its commission by means of intensified application of

St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, Middle East Center Archive, J.A.M. Faraday Papers, GB 165-0101, [Hereafter
Faraday Papers GB 165-0101, (MECA)], Annual Administrative Report 1932 by R.G. B. Spicer.
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the patrol system, and close contact with those who have shown themselves to be
definitely professional criminals.223

Overall, Spicer was quite proud of how his men were responding to the new training programs
and new way of doing business. Things seemed to be on the right track in the early 1930s, until
that is the 1933 Riots. They serve as the first large-scale instance of violence during Spicer’s
leadership.
The Riots of 1933
The 1929 massacre, as has been shown, was an unplanned, disorganized manifestation of
growing Arab discontent and agitation propagated by the Grand Mufti. In its aftermath, Arabs
grew even more dissatisfied with the immigration of Eastern European Jews into the Holy Land.
This was all despite the recommendations made by the Hope Simpson Report to halt Jewish
immigration. British mishandling of the situation served only to provoke further violence. As
Horne writes, “the British seemed hell bent upon a course of antagonizing Arabs as well as Jews
with their curious belief that the two races could be forced to live side by side in one tiny
country.”224 Prior to this point, it was not so unreasonable to think that co-habitation was a
possibility. For most of the 1920s, events in Palestine were relatively peaceful. The 1929
Massacre, when viewed in conjunction with the attempt at reform made via the various
commissions and reports, suggest that Jews and Arabs living together and sharing the Holy Land
was a viable option if proper action was taken. Yet, the events of 1933 coupled with British
refusal to limit Jewish immigration, placed a peaceful resolution beyond hope for the foreseeable
future.
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Beginning in the autumn of 1933, Arab leaders became more vocal in their opposition to
Jewish immigration and settlement. The primary modes of resistance were columns in local
newspapers and protest parades. Obviously the latter made the police more nervous than the
former. In October 1933 Arab petition requests were filed to march in protest of Zionist
settlement. The Arab petitions were rejected by the Palestine Police which feared that the
demonstrations would escalate into full-scale riots. There were small pockets of protest, which
sprang up randomly throughout October despite the formal petition rejection. Still, they were
easily dispersed by mounted constables and men on foot. These disturbances began in Jerusalem
on October 13th, yet it was not long before these small pockets began to grow larger and
eventually reached a crescendo on Friday the 27th of, October 1933 in Nablus, Jaffa, Haifa, and
Jerusalem.225
The morning began in Jaffa without incident and seemed to be a day like any other.
However, sometime before noon the storefronts in the Clock Tower Square began to close and
the square stood oddly vacant. Just after mid-day prayers, the streets were flooded by an armed
mob. The size of this crowd has been disputed by those present with some estimates being as
high as ten thousand and others putting the number between three and four thousand. The
Murison Commission, after having reviewed photographic evidence and accounting for the size
of the square, estimated that the crowd was around 8,880 strong.226 As the crowd entered the
square they were met by a line of the Palestine Police standing behind shields with batons
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drawn.227 Looming over the line of constables were forty mounted officers. The report cites
witnesses recalling the mob as being ‘menacing’, ‘truculent’, and ‘dangerous’. The District
Commissioner, Robert Crosbie, described the armed men holding their weapons above their
heads as being a, ‘perfect forest of sticks’ waving in the air.228
J.A.M. Faraday, the Palestine Police officer in command of Jaffa, first attempted to make
a peaceful appeal to the crowd and urged, in Arabic, to disperse and return home. When the
request to disperse was ignored, Faraday ordered the police to perform a baton charge, whereby
they attempted to disperse the crowd by force. The constables on foot proceeded forward,
spreading out to open the ranks and allow the mounted units to fill them. Two policemen were
stabbed during the first charge and the line was forced to retreat and re-form. The second charge
was more successful in pushing the crowd back, but again the police were forced to retreat and
re-form. Following the third charge, Faraday made yet another plea to the crowd to disperse. By
this point a contingent of Palestine Police armed with rifles were in position.229 The ‘firing party’
was ordered to release a volley after the third baton charge, but this did little to compel the crowd
into retreating. As the report goes on to describe the situation:
Then Mr. Faraday (referring to the collapse of the horses already mentioned)
called out to the District Commissioner, Mr. Crosbie, ‘Horses are not good: only
rifles are any good, can I shoot again’? The District Commissioner gave his
consent and at the same time the Superintendent of Police, Mr. McConnell, said to
Mr. Faraday, ‘Hold you fire as long as possible’.230
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Faraday did hold the order for a moment, but then ordered the second volley to be fired into the
crowd. Unlike the first volley this one had an effect; the crowd gave way as the police line began
to command the flanks of the crowd and push it back into three different streets. The ‘firing
party’ then split into three groups and fired a third volley, pushing the crowd further back into
one of the three streets. During this time shots were still being fired from the crowd. Also, a hail
of projectiles continued to rain down on the Palestine Police.231 Despite the resistance of the
crowd, the three volleys fired proved enough to clear the square. All of this occurred between
noon and roughly 12:30 PM. As the disturbance in Clock Tower Square seemed to be under
control Faraday went to King George’s Avenue to check in with another contingent of policemen
who had also been able to push back an offshoot of the primary crowd. Upon returning to the
square the riot had concluded by 1:15 PM.232
In Haifa a similar disturbance took place later in the evening around 7:30 PM. A crowd
numbering close to two-thousand was met at the police barracks by a baton line and firing party
of four rifles. District Superintendent of Police, Major Foley, like Faraday ordered the immediate
dispersion of the crowd in both English and Arabic. As the crowd became more violent, Foley
ordered a volley to be fired. The crowd retreated, but immediately returned with a hail of stones
and bricks. A second volley effectively dispersed the crowd. The report tells us, “During the
charge one British Constable was seriously stabbed in the back. One man who was in the front of
the crowd received a bullet wound. From the stones and boulders afterwards found in the police
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barracks, it was clear that a savage attack had been made.”233 During that night the District
Commissioner met with local Arab notables who assured the Commissioner that every effort
would be made to halt the violence.
In contrast to the incidents in Jaffa, Haifa, and Nablus which were planned by and
instigated by Arab leaders, the disturbance in Jerusalem was, as the report suggests, “mainly
fortuitous”. Unlike the other cities there was no definite and pre-planned protest march. The 27th
was comparatively peaceful even when news of the Jaffa disturbance reached the city. Unruly
young men began to enter the city and spread false rumors of crowds being mowed down by
machine gun fire. Still, no violence was reported on Friday.
Jaffa was host to the greatest amount of violence, but the violence was confined to the
events of Friday October 27th. In Haifa, the violence resumed the next morning. Despite the
promise of Arab leaders, hostile crowds began to gather in the east. By 8:45 AM a large group of
nearly three hundred made their way toward the police barracks. The report claims that British
Inspector Mosedale stood “in the doorway of the barracks, pointed a rifle at them and they ran
away.”234 The crowd later returned with twice the number throwing stones at the barracks. After
the pleas of six policemen to disperse were ignored, police whistles were blown and orders to
disperse were made again. As the crowd began to throw more stones Mosedale ordered two shots
be fired at the legs of the crowd. This did nothing to deter it. Two more shots were fired. Still,
this did nothing to compel the crowd into retreating. It was not until Foley arrived with a small
group of Arab leaders that the crowd was convinced to retreat. Throughout the rest of the day,
attacks were made upon several Jews in the city, and small groups of Arabs roamed the street.
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Aside from the attacks on Jews, there were no other incidents on Saturday the 28th. However,
small incidents sprang up through Tuesday the 31st.235
At the same time Mosedale was facing the barracks crowd in Haifa, Inspector of Police
Muhd Saadi was confronted by a crowd of one-hundred-fifty at Herod’s Gate in Jerusalem. Saadi
fired into the crowd as they advanced upon him. The crowd began to launch stones at the
Inspector until a police-tender with fifteen armed policemen arrived on the scene and dispersed
the crowd. The following day a large crowd mustered at the Jerusalem Mosque shortly after
noon. The crowd grew in number as half traveled toward the Damascus Gate while half made its
way toward the Jaffa Gate.236 The three policemen at the Damascus Gate, one of whom was
Major Monroe, fired a total of four shots into the advancing crowd until it dispersed. Meanwhile,
a crowd of eight hundred advanced on the Jaffa Gate and the two police constables Reginald
Mott and Abdulla Zahar. The crowd fell upon Mott and Zahar while the two blew their whistles
and attempted to fight off the crowd with the butt of their rifles. Mott was knocked to the ground
and was begin dragged back toward the Mosque. According to the report, Mott called out to
Zahar to fire into the crowd. Each man (Mott still had possession of his rifle) fired two shots into
the crowd. The crowd continued on until Mott fired three more shots into the crowd. Aside from
several rioters throwing stones at the police station this marked the end of the Jerusalem
disturbance.237
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When the dust had settled after several days of protest twenty-seven were dead and twohundred-forty-three were injured. Of the dead, one police officer was killed by a thrown rock and
twenty-six citizens were killed as a result of gunfire. Among the injured fifty-six were
policemen; three of when were seriously stabbed. Meanwhile, seventy-three citizens were
seriously injured by gunfire. The remainder of the injured citizens suffered only minor
wounds.238
The commission concluded that it was clear from all the witnesses it had interviewed that
the cause of the disturbances was the result of the Arab Executive calling upon Arabs to hold
demonstrations to protest against the policy of the British and Palestine Governments toward
Jewish immigration. Further, they concluded that the first outbreak of disturbances in Haifa and
that at Nablus were the direct result of the disturbances in Jaffa. As far as the behavior of the
police during the riots, it was the opinion of the Murrison Commission that the Palestine Police
showed “great restraint” when attempting to disperse the crowds. Foley and Faraday in particular
received high praise for their capable command. Spicer affirmed this praise years later when
writing about Faraday:
In regard to the serious riots which took place at Jaffa in 1933, I can
conscientiously stat that I attribute to his leadership the prompt and entirely
successful manner in which this embryo revolt was stamped out. His gallantry on
this occasion was remarkable and throughout the 48 hours of bloodshed and riot,
he entirely disregarded his own personal safety, setting an example to all ranks of
the force, both British, Arab and Jew, which had an exhilarating effect on all of
them.239
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The 1933 Riots were over and the Palestine Police had come through the ordeal
vindicated. The improvements made over the previous years were largely seen as a
success. While the riots had their share of casualties, they were handled effectively by the
Police Force without resorting to military intervention. In accordance with
recommendations made by the Dowbiggin Report, small garrisons of military personnel
were placed throughout Palestine to be called upon in the case of insurrection. These
garrisons were placed on alert during the riots, but were never called into action. The plan
seemed to work perfectly.
Still, the tactics used by the Palestine Police can be seen as much more
aggressive. With the introduction of ‘firing squads’ and the more formalized use of
firearms the character of the police seemed to be changing. Until this point the men were
certainly familiar with the use of rifles and revolvers, yet from the end of the 1929
Massacre on we see an unending escalation of violent tactics between the Palestine Police
and the unruly segments of the population.
The next three years passed without another major incident. The Palestine Police
had shown that it could handle a large-scale disturbances, but that did not mean Spicer
was satisfied. He continued to try and implement more reforms and hone the training of
his men. Being a man of “vision” he was trying to anticipate what problems the future
held. However, no matter how innovative he was, he could not anticipate how bad things
would become. He certainly could not anticipate a world war, and he certainly could not
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anticipate the reactions Jews, who many of his men had died to protect. Ironically, it was
Jews rather than Arabs who would eventually become the greatest threat to life.240
The Arab Revolt 1936-1939
The Arab Revolt represents the most serious escalation of violence in the Mandate. Arab
discontent over the continued Jewish quest to establish a permanent homeland began to move
beyond the means of conventional diplomacy. In much the same way that Irish republicans lost
faith in constitutional attempts to achieve Home Rule, Arab contingents felt that violence was the
only viable course of action. In this section the origins of this revolt and how the Palestine Police
experienced it shall be discussed and analyzed. The two major consequences of the Arab
Rebellion were the formation of Jewish gangs, and yet another period of police reform.
As is so often the case in the eruption of large-scale violence, the origins of the Arab
Rebellion stem from a small, seemingly unrelated incident. On 15 April 1936 two Jews were
assaulted and killed on the road connecting Tulkarm and Nablus. The guilty party was an Arab
gang of bandits with no political or religious agenda to speak of. Regardless, the murder of two
innocent Jews was sure to provoke some kind of violent retribution from the Jewish community.
The funeral for the two Jews, held in Tel Aviv, served as a stage for an anti-Arab
demonstrations. Horne observed that funerals in Palestine “can be the bane of policemen. It gives
the opportunity for emotive Semites of both races to bitterly harangue the wickedness of the
other party, to the absolute exclusion of all reason.”241 This proved to be the case in Tel Aviv
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where several Arabs found themselves the focus of physical and verbal attacks. Although the
Arabs were relatively unharmed, rumor spread to neighboring cities that they had been killed at
the funeral. This led to yet another round of reprisal with Arab gangs attacking groups of Jews
resulting in three deaths.
Learning from previous incidents, the government took swift action by imposing a
curfew in Jaffa and Tel Aviv. Further, the Emergency Regulations of 1936, as well as the
Palestine Defense Order in Council were enacted. These allowed the government, police, and
military to take extra measures to prevent wide-spread rioting. Crowds that began to form were
quickly and peacefully dispersed by the police, as well as the small units of army troops placed
in each city under the recommendations made by the Dowbiggin Report. 242 Tom Eddison, who
was in the last few months of his contract, recalled that when dispersing the minor
demonstrations, “the District Officers asked the people if they were inabsut min el police, i.e.
pleased with us as they say, they reply ‘Oh yes, they are very good. They did not attack us or
anything.’ Actually we get on very well with them.”243 Coupled with the curfew things remained,
for the moment, quiet.
During this period of calm, Arab leaders met in Nablus to form the ‘National Committee’
and discuss what could be done to combat the continuation of Jewish immigration and lack of
interest on behalf of the British Government in changing the status quo of immigration policy.
The committee decided on a general strike of all Arabs until their demands were met. The
decision of the National Committee led to the formation of subordinate committees in other

During this time, Binley wrote about the uneasy nature of things: “Perhaps rather foolishly I continued to patrol
hostile areas alone with my Arab constables, but no attempt was made on my life. To try to suppress the revolt, the
British Government increased the military, who sometimes operated in the area, but with never less than a hundred
men.” See, Binsley, Palestine Police Service, 97.
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cities. With the cooperation of these committees a ‘Supreme Arab Committee’ was put together
by the Mufti of Jerusalem on April 25th, 1936 and sought to galvanize all of the individual efforts
being made. Three days prior the National Committee called for a strike of all Arab workers. The
decision was supported by the Supreme Arab Committee, demanding a halt to Jewish
immigration as well as an end to the transfer of Arab lands to Jews. Tom Eddison recalls this
period:
All the Arabs here are on strike now as a result of the recent riots. They are
protesting about Jewish immigration. In Gaza every shop in the suks is closed ,
even the coffee houses. There is a curfew in the town now, and every night a
patrol goes out to catch people outside. Usually just about curfew time a bomb
goes off somewhere near at 9p.m. (curfew time). Last night there wasn’t one and
we have decided to protest the strike committee for keeping us out of the canteen
unnecessarily. It is quite a joke the regular ‘time signal’.244

The timing of this strike could not have been worse for the British government as 4,500 Jewish
immigrants were approved to enter Palestine on May 18th. For the entire month, all Arab labor
and industry remained at a standstill.
Summer wore on, and the strike continued. However, the temporary peace began to wear
thin. Armed gangs began to attack anyone and everyone who stood opposed to them. As Horne
described the situation: “these attacks were many and the security forces suffered simply because
they were there. Jews suffered simply because they were Jews; but many Arabs suffered also,
because they either worked for the government, or for some reason refused to strike.”245 In a way
that seems to mirror IRA attacks on security forces in Ireland, police in Palestine now found
themselves the target of Arab violence. On 28 May 1936 Constable Robert Bird was followed
down an alley by four Arab men and shot to death. In a letter to Edward Horne, a former
244
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constable claimed that the assassination of Bird did more than anything else to band the police
together into a more cautious and watchful force. The Palestine Police had to fear more than just
death in the line of duty. Outright assassination quickly became a reality of the job.246
Despite this danger the Mandate was still in need of new recruits. The natural turnover of the
force required a constant influx of young men who were eager to find adventure. One such man,
Stephen Edwards, joined not long after the beginning of the Arab Rebellion on 14 November
1936. Edwards recounts that he was drawn to the force by a recruiting poster which read:
The Palestine Police offers excellent prospects for men of good character, energy and
intelligence who are keen to succeed in an important and very interesting
profession…During the last two years over 300 promotions to the inspectorate have been
made with corresponding promotions from the ranks to N.C.O…Here is a fine
opportunity for a man both to benefit himself and at the same time to perform valuable
service for his country in one of the most responsible and vital jobs in the British
Empire.247

Upon arrival in Palestine, Edwards was put through the end result of Inspector General Spicer’s
labors. The men were first put through training in the Police Mobile Force to reinforce district
police. This allowed them to familiarize themselves with the area while not being directly in the
‘line of fire’.248 Then they were passed into the Training Depot at Jerusalem where they received
further instruction in criminal law, language, and other police duties.249
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From the training that the Palestine Police received it appeared that they were not being
prepared to wage war. However, as in earlier episodes, it seems that their duties began to take on
an increasingly militaristic character. Whether the Palestine Police disagreed with how they were
being implemented, undoubtedly their day-to-day police duties, especially during the Arab
Revolt, look more like the duties of an occupying force rather than a security force. For example,
everyday patrols were a perilous activity. When driving through the streets, gangs often erected
road-blocks just around the corner of patrol lanes. This presented the perfect opportunity for the
gangs to ambush the patrols. The officers on patrol had few options but to attempt to clear the
road-block while under fire. The only thing to protect the men while trying to clear the road was
covering fire from the Lewis gun that was equipped on each armored car. These types of
ambushes were very common not just in urban areas, but also in rural areas where the police
would often have to serve as escorts to government officials or supply convoys attempting to
prop up the region during the ongoing strike. Eddison describes the prospect of trouble and the
anxiety of waiting for it to happen:
Today there is a ‘stand to’. Everyone is ready to dash out at a minute’s notice.
Fully armed. Saddles, batons, rifles are all where we can grab them and leave on
the double. The machine gun team is mucking round the gun turret. All this over a
general Arab strike all over Palestine…The other day half a million rounds of
ammo and Lord knows how many new rifles were seized at Jaffa. They come
from Belgium in barrels of cement and were for a Jew. The Arabs say the Jews
are arming and will attack them and that it is all the fault of the British. We know
that both lots are bringing in arms but you can’t search every receptacle that
comes into the country. Three frontiers are land ones. The land the other side is
half civilized and arms can come in anywhere. A cop only covers as much ground
as his feet do. There is not much likelihood of trouble in Gaza as there are no
Jews. Perhaps if news came through that Arabs had been killed in Jaffa or
Jerusalem or somewhere in a fight, things might start.250
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Violence continued throughout the rest of the summer and into the autumn of 1936 until there
was a significant lull starting in January and lasting through July 1937. This lull extended to
attacks upon the Palestine Police themselves. Meanwhile, Arab terrorists continued to make
sporadic attacks against Jews and Jewish property.251 The nature of ‘terrorist activities’ is
explained by Tegart:
During the rebellion of 1936 terrorism was intensive and widespread, every part
of the country being affected by it in one way or another. In 1937 it was not so
widespread, but from time to time outrages of the most brutal nature were
committed in different parts of the country. The terrorist campaign in 1937 was
accompanied, particularly in the last quarter, by a campaign of sabotage mainly of
telephone and railway lines.252

When reporting to the House of Commons in July, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, William Ormsby-Gore cited that since May eighty-six Arabs, four Christians, thirtyeight Jews, three police officers and four soldiers had been killed in Palestine. Later in the month
he informed the Commons that the strike and the situation in Palestine in general had not
changed. MP William Gallacher asked Ormsby-Gore if he was aware that British policemen
were protesting against the attempt to use them as soldiers and that a number were sent home
under arrest from Haifa because of such protests. Ormsby-Gore replied that,
the duties of the Palestine Police Force, which is an armed force, are prescribed
by various Ordinances, by regulations made thereunder, and by special
regulations made by the High Commissioner, since the outbreak of the
disturbances, under the Palestine Defense Order in Council. I am not aware of any
such protest as that referred to in the second part of the question.253

It is at this point that a conscious decision has been made to refer to the ‘Arab gangs’ as terrorists. The evidence
begins to show Arab attacks targeting non-combatant Jews, especially women and children. Although less organized
than the ‘terrorist gangs’ of the Jews, the actions of the Arabs certainly warrant the branding of ‘terrorist’. Horne, A
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It is unclear where Gallacher was receiving his information, however it is likely that there were
some within the Palestine Police who did not wish to be used in such a manner. There are no
personal memoirs of this particular time period which exhibit police protests to being conflated
with soldiers. However, The Palestine Defense Order in Council of 1931, which were evoked on
April 19, 1936 did give the police powers that resembled those of the military nature. Binsley
recalled that during this period, “the whole country was in turmoil. The Arab terrorists increased,
defied the government, the military and attacked Jewish settlements and government
communications…Trains were mined and derailed, telephone and power lines destroyed, roads
ambushed, and several British Police were killed…A state of emergency was declared and
military courts were empowered to try offences under this law.”254 The Inspector General of
Police and by extension the police were given permission to take possession of any premises or
property that they deemed necessary. Also, any person who discharged a firearm, threw a bomb,
or hindered the effort of His Majesty’s armed forces or the Palestine Police was subject to the
death penalty or life in prison. This sentence was also open to those who tampered with any
piece of infrastructure or attempted to damage any ship or aircraft.255
Following the assassination of Galilee District Commissioner L.Y. Andrews and his
bodyguard Constable McEwan on September 26th 1937, five prominent Arab leaders were
arrested and deported on October 1st.256 Along with the deportations, the Arab Higher
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Committee, of which many of the deported Arab leaders were members, was disbanded and
made illegal. The Mufti of Jerusalem was removed from his office in the Supreme Muslim
Council and forced into hiding. Palestine frontier borders were closed and media censorship was
imposed.
While in hiding the Mufti was able to designate subordinates to lead Arabs in a continued
revolt against the British government, Jewish settlements, and the Zionist cause. Arab Overall
Field Commander Fawzi ed Din Kauwakji was one such subordinate.257 As the most experienced
military leader among the Arabs, Kauwakji was able to divide the region and help to establish
gangs within each city, as well as in the countryside. Often these gangs were already in existence
and Kauwakji served to bring them into the fold and disseminate the anti-British/anti-Zionist
propaganda. These gangs, although poorly trained, were able to effectively throw the region into
chaos, overthrow the local authorities in several cities and even establish a new government in a
few of them.
As the violence of 1936 grew increasingly worse, yet another commission was called into
existence. This time the commission was headed by Lord William Peel and news of its formation
was published on July 7, 1937.258 The Peel Commission was charged with determining the
underlying causes of the disturbances which had been taking place over the course of the year
and to “ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the Mandate, either the
Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances on account of the way in which the Mandate
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has been or is being implemented.”259 If any of these “grievances” was well-founded, the
commission was to make a recommendation as to what should be done about the situation.
The findings of the Peel Commission were not surprising to those who lived in Palestine.
Peel concluded that Arab nationalism and Jewish nationalism had remained unchanged since the
1920s. If anything they had grown more intense. According to Peel, this nationalism was bred
into each generation by the educational system and propagated by the youth movement. Further,
Peel thought that the position of the Palestine Government, and by extension the British
Government, was an unwinnable one. Any decision made would anger one party or the other.260
Recommendations for a restriction of Jewish immigration were again made, but what is
significant about the Peel Commission is that it made the bold declaration that the British had
fulfilled their obligation to establish a Jewish National Home as the Jewish population then
exceeded four hundred thousand. 261 Despite the recommendation to cap Jewish immigration at
twelve thousand per year, the commission recognized that restrictions on Jewish immigration,
“will not solve the Palestine problem. The National Home seems already too big to the Arabs
and, whatever its size, it bars the way to their attainment of national independence.”262 With this
understanding, the commission made its boldest assessment: Palestine should be partitioned.
While it was stated that the commission was not in a position to lay out the terms for partition, it
did recommend that the plan for partition which had been suggested nearly twenty years earlier
was the only real solution available. 263
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While all of these assessments were important to the problems that faced the Palestine
Police, the section that affected them directly was concerned with the operation of the Mandate.
According to the commission:
[a]lthough expenditure on public security rose from LP265,000 in 1923 to over
LP862,000 in 1935-36 (and LP2,230,000 in 1936-37, the year of the
disturbances), it is evident that the elementary duty of providing public security
has not been discharged. Should disorder break out again of such a nature as to
require the intervention of the Military, there should be no hesitation in enforcing
martial law throughout the country under undivided military control. 264

The Peel Commission clearly thought that the Palestine Police could not be trusted to
handle a full insurrection alone. It made the recommendation that the police be reinforced
with an increase in reserve units, as well as an increase in mounted units.
For all that he had done Spicer had reached the end of his career with the Palestine
Police. It was time for a changing of the guard and the man to succeed him was the well-liked
former Deputy Inspector-General, Alan Saunders. Saunders took over command in November
1937 just as violent attacks began to once again become more frequent. The kind of crime being
committed stretched as far as one’s imagination. A small sampling of Criminal Investigation
Department entries between December 1937 and June 1938 reveal incidents such as gang
kidnapping, Public Works Department stores set on fire, A Jewish bus fired upon, twenty-one
telephone wires were cut, shots fired on police and shots returned, shots fired at a party of youths
and girls, and a bomb fails to explode after being thrown into a bus stop.265 These kinds of
headlines appeared every single day. There was not a single day without violence or an attempt
at violence. Binsley recalls one of the Jewish buses that was fired upon:
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The Arab terrorists also made use of this waste ground to attack Jewish buses at
night as they climbed slowly up the hill. One night, I was throwing bruised
oranges from the side balcony on to this waste ground and Bobbie, a spaniel,
naturally dashed on to retrieve them. He must have disturbed armed men, for
shots were fired. At first I thought we would be attacked but duty bound went out
armed only with a revolver to investigate. Going on the road I ran up the hill, the
firing ceased and at the top I saw a deserted Jewish bus. Going inside and using
my torch I saw a genteel old lady sitting quietly in her seat, seemingly not
realizing her danger so putting my hand on her shoulder I asked her to leave the
bus immediately. To my horror she was quite dead and fell on to the seat. The
driver and passengers had ignored her in their panic to escape. I was sad and
angry at both the terrorist and the driver who had deserted her, so was rather curt
with him when he returned with assistance to collect the bus.266

These attacks and bouts of insurrection which began in the autumn of 1937 continued throughout
all of 1938. The gangs were several different titles including rebels, bandits, and some went so
far as to brand them terrorists. However the British soldiers and policemen in the region often
took to calling them by the colloquial, ‘Oozelbarts’. This name was derived from the title given
to a leader of a gang, ‘Qaid el Ursabi’. The plural form of this title is ‘Ursabat’ which was
transformed into Oozelbart. The soldiers and policemen were under constant threat from
Oozelbart attack. As Horne writes, “Throughout 1938 the stories of heroism, frustration and
disasters still poured in, and the strain of it all began to show upon the faces of the men.”267
Whether it was attacks made directly upon them or having to respond to attacks made on
someone else at all hours of the day, the constant threat of terror took its toll upon the men.
In an attempt to combat this violence and in response to the Peel Commission, Sir
Charles Tagert was asked to investigate the Palestine Police and offer recommendations for
improvement. Tagert spent the next several years in and out of Palestine serving as an advisor
calling for many worthwhile and constructive changes to the force. The most lasting of these
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initiatives were the so called ‘Tagert Forts’. These were a number of defensive barracks which
were built throughout Palestine. Beginning in 1938 Tagert designed reinforced concrete
fortresses that could survive an extended siege.268 In addition to the Tagert Forts, Tagert himself
made the recommendation to expand the command structure of the force and add an additional
1,250 more men. This would allow the police to more effectively assume control of urban areas
and expand into rural areas.269
However, as 1938 gave way to a new year the large-scale gang operations began to wane.
With each passing month more and more local gang leaders were either being betrayed by their
subordinates, turned in to the police, or caught. This lead to a crumbling of the leadership
structure that Kauwajki had helped to establish. The end came quickly and by the summer of
1939 the Arab Rebellion was all but over. Yet it was a costly period in the history of the
mandate. As Horne reported:
In the fifteen months beginning with 1st January 1938, there had been over 6,000
major incidents logged by the police, 936 murders reported and 351 attempted
murders. 2,125 incidents of sniping without including police and troop
engagements. 472 bombs thrown and detonated. 364 cases of armed robbery.
1,453 cases of sabotage against government and commercial property. 323
persons abducted, mostly for purposes of ransom. 72 cases of intimidation for
political ends. 236 Jews killed by Arabs, 435 Arabs killed by Jews, mostly while
defending settlements. 1,200 rebels known to have been killed by police and
military action and a further 535 rebels wounded. From the very beginning of the
Arab Revolt to its termination, over 100 British Arab and Jewish police officers
were killed, or died of wounds or accidents while on duty. The number of the
servicemen killed during the same period is not known to the writer but would
seem to be higher.270
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The Arab gangs had made their voice heard. They were willing to fight and die for the land that
was theirs. However, many of the Jews in the region were also willing to fight for what they
perceived as theirs. As Arab gangs made attacks on Jews and Jewish property, the Jewish
communities felt the need to protect themselves. It was this need to protect and retaliate that led
to the formation of a number of Jewish gangs. It was these new Jewish gangs that would pose the
greatest threat to a Palestine Policeman’s life from 1939 until the end of the mandate. Binsley
captures the brief period of both Jewish and Arab terrorism:
In 1938-1939 the situation worsened, the Arab terrorists became more active in
the towns, extorting money, attacking Jews and assassinating police informers, so
although many murders were committed, no information was available. Often I
have walked the main shopping street to investigate a reported shooting to find
the body lying in the deserted street. It was so common, that shoppers and
shopkeepers knew the routine…The Jews were the first to use time bombs to
destroy their enemy, but as usual it was the innocent who were the victims. It
occurred one morning in the main vegetable market in the central suq which was
crowded daily by women shoppers buying the family fruit and vegetables. The
time bomb had been delivered in a crate of Jewish oranges and exploded at peak
time killing forty Arabs, mainly women and children. It was a gory sight, with
severed limbs and bodies scattered among the debris of fruit and vegetables. This,
of course, inflamed the Arabs and made our task more difficult.271

While for a time both parties were attacking each other and the police, as Great Britain moved
into the Second World War, it was the Jewish terrorists who were the greatest threat to a
constable’s life. It is this subject which will be covered in the next chapter.
. . ..
The1930s represent a time when the Palestine Police faced a number of new threats and
challenges and responded to them remarkably well. As it has been shown, the 1929 Massacre
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forced the Palestine Police to reevaluate how they policed the Mandate. This initiated a period of
‘riot and reform’. The 1933 Riots vindicated the Police who proved that the three years of
commissions, reports and reform allowed them to handle a sustained, near Mandate-wide
disturbance without the assistance of the military. Further, the fact that their success in the 1933
Riots still initiated commissions and reform serves to underpin the idea that the force was a
progressive one intent on looking toward the next threat. Finally, the Arab Revolt of 1933-1936
proved that the police had evolved to handle the threat of rioting and violence of Arab gangs, but
could not anticipate the rise of a greater threat: terrorism. To conclude, in each case the force was
tested to retain control and each case saw a certain measure of success. Regardless, following
each incident there came a time of reform whereby the force attempted to adapt to the everchanging landscape of threats.
The 1930s were certainly the years of greatest growth for British colonial policing in the
Palestine Mandate. While the late 1920s saw the beginning of training reforms, the continual
state of ‘riot and reform’ forced the Palestine Police into a position where it had to become wellversed in traditional police work, riot control, and even combating early forms of sabotage and
terrorist-like attacks. The brute force that was implemented in Ireland, and to some extent during
the early days of the Mandate, simply could not work in the complex socio-political climate that
existed in the 1930s. Yet, even though the Palestine Police reached a level of relative control, the
following decade saw the explosion of a world war and with it a new, more overwhelming
problem within the Mandate.
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Chapter IV: War and the End of the Mandate
The old idiom, ‘out of the frying pan and into the fire’ is used to describe jumping from a
bad situation into an even worse one. This happens to be the case when considering the position
of the Palestine Police during World War Two. As soon as the Arab Rebellion had reached its
conclusion, Great Britain declared war on Germany. While not an immediate threat to Palestine
in 1939 the war eventually began to loom large over the region. The police themselves were
faced with a strange and dangerous situation; as the Arab Rebellion had grown more violent,
armed Jewish gangs and defense organizations emerged. While not immediately a significant
threat to the Palestine Police, groups such as the Stern Gang and the Irgun made wartime in
Palestine a waking nightmare. Further, the Arab population, though loyal to the British, were
always an enticing target for German propaganda. Also, in an unprecedented decision, after years
of being treated as a military force, the Palestine Police were conscripted into military service.
To sum up the wartime police perspective, the Palestine Police had to worry about attack and
sabotage from Jewish terrorists, the defection and insurrection of the Arab population, all the
while contributing to the war effort.
Following the war the situation did not improve. Jewish terrorists grew bolder and attacks
on British personnel in the Mandate increased. The greatest recipient of violence was no longer
the Jewish or Arab population, but the British. It quickly became clear that there was no saving
the Mandate, at least not for the British themselves. Plans were drawn for the evacuation of Great
Britain and by the summer of 1948 all of the Empire’s agents had been recalled.
It is the argument of this chapter that the rise of Jewish paramilitary groups along with
the events of the World War Two created a situation in Palestine in which the police could only
combat, but not control. To support this argument we will attempt to first understand how the
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Palestine Police attempted to augment its training to both combat terrorism and be effective in a
military capacity. Finally, the loss of control and the Empire’s exit from the Mandate will be
discussed and analyzed.
War and Terrorism
Before moving forward it is important to understand the Jewish military organizations
that began during and in response to the Arab Rebellion. There were four main Jewish
paramilitary forces of note during the Second World War. The first, The Hagana, was a large
defensive organization, designed for the defense of Jewish towns, settlements and so on. By
1945 the Hagana was nearly one-hundred thousand strong. The second, the Palmach, was the
offensive organization and strike force arm of the Hagana. The Palmach were well-trained, fulltime guerilla fighters. According to a secret report on Jewish military organizations, it was found
that the ranks of the Palmach were largely filled with ex-European servicemen. For both of these
units, it could be expected that they would follow the orders of the Jewish Agency.272 The
government’s report on the Jewish military organizations, which was filed at the end of the
Second World War, describes the two organizations as follows:
Trouble from the STERN GANG or IRGUN can be expected at any time, and had
indeed been going on in a minor way throughout the last year. Conflict with the
HAGANA or PALMACH is unlikely prior to an open break between the
Government and the Jewish Agency, should the latter occur the PALMACH
might be encountered anywhere, and its strength, and organization demand sound
military precautions to avoid “unfortunate incidents”. The main HAGANA is only
likely to be met in a defencive role, but in such a role might put up a defence if a
272
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well populated area which could entail an attack of some considerable scope to
overcome it.273

There were those groups which did not follow the orders of the Jewish Agency. It is
important to make a distinction between these paramilitary forces and the terrorist organizations
working in the Mandate such as the Irgun and Stern Gang. The Irgun was originally a sabotage
organization that sought to destroy infrastructure in order to inhibit British operations. It often
undertook operations such as blowing up pipelines, railways, and telegraph lines. Finally, there
was the Stern Gang which specialized in assassination. Started by intellectual and Hebrew
University of Jerusalem graduate, Abraham Stern, the gang has been described as “terrorists pure
and simple,” who “murder to shock the world – thinking only of the ‘justice of their cause’—
irrespective of the innocence of their victims.”274 The actions of the Irgun and Stern Gang can be
compared to those taken by Sinn Fein and eventually the IRA. In each instance factions of larger
groups grew tired of diplomatic attempts at a British exit. In Palestine, the situation was further
complicated by Arab dissatisfaction with Jewish immigration. It was a surprising situation, to
those in England, that during and after the resolution of World War II, “there should be two
unofficial armies lined up against each other in a country that is still administered by His
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Majesty’s Government.”275 Moreover, it was unsettling that two major groups had emerged with
the prime directive to destroy the British Government in Palestine by any means necessary. More
unsettling is the fact that these groups were operating within the Mandate prior to and during the
war itself.
Jack Binsley recalls that in 1939 these terrorists started a campaign against the British
which gradually increased and lasted until the end of the British mandate in 1948. It is clear from
Binsley’s writings that he and his fellow policemen, felt genuinely betrayed by the fact that they
were being attacked and killed by the very people they had once protected. As Binsley wrote:
This, in my opinion, was the most blatant ingratitude toward a benevolent
country who had granted them access to Palestine and then protected them from
the Arabs to allow them [to] create a home in the Holy Land. Without British
police protection, they would never have been allowed to live in a country owned
by the Arabs for two thousand years. We acted as a buffer between them and the
Arabs so that they could buy Arab land, dispossess the tenants and populate the
most fertile land, pushing the Arabs back into the barren interior…Given an inch ,
they took a yard brought in more immigrants, until to pacify the Arabs, the
Government ordained a quota of permitted immigrants based on the absorptive
capacity of the country. They continued to exceed this by illegal immigration and
continued to do so when the war started and all immigration ceased…The police,
as usual, bore the brunt of their actions. We who had protected them at personal
risk, trained them to use firearms to protect themselves, had this knowledge
turned against us. Britain was fighting a war against their arch enemy, Hitler, yet
they chose this time to wage their own private war against the British, preventing
troops from being better employed fighting Germany.276

In this passage, Binsley is describing the actions of the Jewish terrorists during and after the
Second World War. It does not appear that Binsley harbored any malicious anti-Semitism. His
previous writing has only good things to say about the Jews with whom he worked and policed.
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It seems that this sense of betrayal was directed at violent nationalists who resorted to terrorism
and targeted the British.
Moving back to the activity of the Arab militias, the leadership of these groups from city
to city may have dissolved, but there were still many influential leaders in the overarching Arab
community.277 Luckily for the British Empire, at the outbreak of war, the Arab community
leaders were quick to swear allegiance to the Crown. This promised a more peaceful future for
the Palestine Police than they had experienced in the previous three years, at least in terms of
dealing with the Arabs. Still, it is easy to understand, especially in retrospect, that the antiSemitic propaganda of Hitler’s Third Reich posed an attractive and potentially dangerous threat
to an Arab population that was widely dissatisfied with continued Jewish immigration. So, while
there was a period of notable peace during the war with respect to the Arabs, the Palestine Police
needed to remain vigilant.
After the violence of the Arab Revolt subsided during the summer of 1939 it was only a
matter of months until Great Britain declared war on Germany on September 3rd. The period of
the Second World War represents a unique time in the history of the Palestine Police. For the
first time violence from and between Arabs and Jews was not necessarily the greatest concern
facing the security forces. Instead the Palestine Police, after years of being treated as a military
force, was actually drafted by the empire into His Majesty’s service. Further, many of the
members of the force, who were ex-servicemen themselves, desired to rejoin their old regiments
and aid in the war effort. While the British government, military forces, and security forces were
largely concerned with threat of Axis powers working through neighboring countries, the specter

Until this point the terms ‘Jewish gangs’ and ‘Arab gangs’ have been used. As Jewish gangs became more
closely associated with more legitimate groups it is more accurate to describe them as militias.
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of Arab-Jewish unrest erupting always loomed large over the Palestine Mandate. This created a
problem when a significant portion of the force wished to return to their former military
regiments at the outbreak of war. With the possibility of Axis powers swaying the allegiance of
the Arab population, the Palestine Police could not have their effectiveness crippled by force
depletion. As former Constable William Hornsey put it:
[t]here must have been 1,000 ex-army men in the force at the time, all of us in the
pink of fitness and we nearly all opted to go back to our regiments. Our regiments
were our former homes and we had strong loyalties. There were so many requests
to terminate contracts that Headquarters asked us to wait awhile, so that things
could be sorted out.278

The British and Palestine Governments sought to end any attempt to leave the police by enacting
the Defense Regulations of 1940. This had the effect of preventing any member of the security
force from abandoning his post. The other outcome which will become important later was the
option for the Palestine Police to be adopted as a military unit under the Army Act 1881.
Initially, the Palestine government chose not to enact this provision.279
Because the men were not allowed to leave, anyone who refused to carry out their duties
or tried to abandon the force was arrested and placed in prison. The problem with this system
was that those who were arrested were only sentenced to three weeks in prison with allowances
for special privileges. This amounted to men leaving the Palestine Police, being arrested, sent to
prison, sun-bathing for three weeks, and then being dishonorably discharged to rejoin their old
military regiment. Seeing that this three week ‘mini-vacation’ was not an effective deterrent the
court changed the punishment. Instead of three weeks with privileges, the men were sentenced to
three months with no privileges. This sentence was then to be carried out not at the local prison
278
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in Acre where the policemen were under the supervision of their former comrades, but at the
Central Prison or at a local Farm Labor camp. This served as a suitable deterrent for most, but
there were still those who were undaunted by the harsher sentence. The issue is further
complicated by the idea that many of the men were uneducated on the legality of what was being
done to them. Many felt that such action to keep them imprisoned for failure to fulfill their duties
was illegal. Regardless, there were a couple of men who pressed their luck. When they tried to
intentionally shirk their duties the courts sentenced them to eighteen months imprisonment. This
measure effectively ended any further attempt to rejoin old military regiments. Further
contributing to lost interest in trying to find their way to the war was the fact that the war was
actually coming to them.280
Throughout 1941 and 1942 the Germans were battling their way through Africa and had
taken control of a large portion of Egypt. Syria was under the control of the Vichy government
and a swift incursion into Turkey by the Axis powers seemed possible. By June 1942 the
situation seemed dire enough to enact the provision of the Defense Regulations of 1940
previously mentioned which allowed the government to transform a police force into a military
force. So, on 27 May 1942, the Palestine High Commissioner, Sir Harold Alfred MacMichael,
made a proclamation which was published on 4 June 1942. The proclamation claimed that the
Palestine Police were a military force for the remainder of the war, and were charged with the
defense of Palestine. This is unique not only to the history of the Palestine Police, but to colonial
policing in general. To this point there had been no other police force within the empire that had
been called upon for military service.
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Horne mentions that during this time many men expressed their dissatisfaction with being
a part of His Majesty’s Armed Forces of the Crown. While many of them were clamoring to
rejoin their old regiments only two years earlier, now presented with the chance to serve in the
war under the Palestine Police some thought that the action was illegal. However, petitions
questioning the legality of the Army Act were shot down by the Palestine Supreme Court citing
it as a form of conscription. While this was essentially true, there was a problem with such a
decision. A portion of the Palestine Police was still comprised of men from the Republic of
Ireland. Although working for the British Empire which was at war, the Republic had not
declared war on the Axis powers. The Irishmen were conscripted like everyone else and luckily
made no objection.281
One of the areas where the Palestine Police was most effective was the transportation of
troops and supplies north to aid in the efforts against Vichy-controlled Syria. Before the police
were conscripted as a military force, they were still helping to contribute to the war effort. As
more troops began to enter the region to combat the threat from Syria they faced a long and
dangerous road north. The Palestine Police who were experts in carrying out dangerous escort
missions in the rural areas of Palestine from their time during the Arab Rebellion, seemed like
the best choice to help the army. They faced a number of roadblocks and ambushes while
making sure whatever they were carrying made it to the destination. They continued to do so
until 12 July 1941 when Vichy commander General Henri Dentz called for an armistice and
ended the military actions in Syria. 282

281
282

Horne, A Job Well Done, 248-251.
Horne, A Job Well Done, 258.

114

The training of the Palestine Police seemed to change with their new war-time duties.
When looking at the service records of Stephen Edwards, we see that throughout the 1940s there
was a serious emphasis on military readiness. The training program of the Palestine Police
throughout the 1930s shows a number of ‘continuing education’ style courses to help the men
adapt to new and emerging threats. For instance Edward’s record shows courses taken on Arabic
language proficiency and border control during the Arab Rebellion. However, in the 1940s there
is a marked shift into military training. One such course that Edwards took was on ‘Platoon
Weapons’. It appear that this course required a proficiency in the application, technical
knowledge, general knowledge, general military knowledge, and tactical ability in the use of
military weaponry.283
Wartime also saw the return of the former Commandant of the Palestine Police,
Mavrogordato. Now serving as Brigadier General for the 9th Army, ‘Mavro’ was responsible for
security within Lebanon and Syria. When choosing who would serve under him he could think of
none more qualified than men from the Palestine Police. His former men knew the territory, they
spoke the language, and were well suited to gather together information and discern what was
important. Sergeant Arthur Callan who had come to the region with the 9th Army and
Mavrogordato explained in a letter to Edward Horne how the members of the intelligence
branches learned a great deal from the Palestine Police. He went on to write:
I honestly believe that everything I know in life of any value to me has come from
the Palestine Police and the security and military intelligence system we set up in
Lebanon and Syria was a wonderful example or just how things ought to be done.
Palestine Police fashion. In this we gave a service out of all proportion to our
numbers.284
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The involvement of the Palestine Police in an Army intelligence endeavor under the command of
a former Inspector General of the force is yet another example of how influential the force had
become within the empire during the war.
When V.E. Day arrived celebrations erupted across Palestine. This moment marks not
only the victory of the Allies over the European Axis powers, but also the zenith of the Palestine
Police power and ability. The war had necessitated the recruitment and training of a record
number of constables. This brought the force’s numbers as high as they would ever be. Some of
the skills that the force was already known for, such as convoy-personnel protection,
investigation, and intelligence gathering were honed to an even greater extent. Finally, after
decades of trial, error, commission, report, and reform, the force was as close to understanding
how to effectively police and control the region as they would ever be. However, this moment
would not last. After the conclusion of the war, men left the force at an alarming rate. Jewish
terrorist organizations grew ever more violent, and the Mandate’s days were numbered, even if
the Palestine Police didn’t know it.
The End of Empire in Palestine
The Palestine Police came out of the Second World War facing very different problems
than it had in 1939. The threat of Arab insurrection was no longer the greatest threat to a
policeman’s life. Instead the Jewish terrorists served as the greatest menace to the Palestine
Police. The way the force dealt with this threat had to be reconfigured as it entered the final
chapter of its existence.
Inspector General Captain J.M. Rymer Jones had brought the Palestine Police through the
Second World War and aided it in dealing with the challenges of war, as well as a new enemy in
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Jewish terrorists.285 However, Rymer’s time with the force had always had an expiration date
upon it. He was on loan to the Palestine Police from the British Metropolitan Police. His twoyear contract had been extended for another year at his request. However, by March of 1946 his
time had run out and his superiors request that he return to London. There was great deal of
debate about who would replace the innovative and well-loved Inspector General. It was not
unreasonable to assume that one of the Assistant Inspector Generals would be promoted. In the
end Lt. Col. W.N. Gray of the Royal Marines was chosen to lead the force. This was a
perplexing choice as Gray had no previous experience or connection to any police force. As it
has been shown the Palestine Police and its forerunners have always been heavily populated and
led by military men. However, these men, at least those chosen to lead, had some previous
affiliation or experience in policing.286
As if Gray did not face enough of an uphill battle, the post-war circumstances in Palestine
had placed him in a difficult position. The two most effective units used against Jewish terrorists
up to that point had been the Police Mobile Force and the Criminal Investigation Department, or
CID.287 By the time Gray had taken command he was put in a position where he had to dismantle
the Police Mobile Force and redistribute its men. The reasoning behind the dismantling of PMF
according to the Palestine Post is as follows:
The P.M.F was formed during the war, Col. Gray’s Order states, when the Army
was fully occupied and unable to assist the Police when military help was
unfortunately necessary. That situation no longer exists, and the necessity of the
P.M.F has lapsed.288
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The reason for this stemmed from leave policy during the war. As war began all those from the
UK were not permitted leave to return home. With the exception of a few men permitted to leave
in 1944, most of the British contingent had not seen their family in seven years. When leave was
finally permitted in 1945 a significant portion of the force was sent home on leave.289 The men
were deservedly upset about not seeing their loved ones for the duration of the war. As one
officer put it,
[s]ome of us have anything from 9 to 20 years’ service in the Force and were due
for leave when war broke out; others have been out here six to eight years without
UK leave and have been on the waiting list since January. We were on the list for
the May boat but are still waiting to get our wives and children home for a little
bit of English summer that might remain by the time we get there.290

This would not have created such a serious problem for Gray except for the fact that once home,
many of the men did not wish to return to Palestine. Already combatting a shortage of men, Gray
was forced to disband the Police Mobile Force and reallocate the men and equipment. As Horne
described the situation, “the terrorists could count upon poorer searching, poorer screening of
suspects, poorer powers of perceptions by the security forces.”291
The relationship between the military units stationed in Palestine and the Palestine Police had
also changed. As it has already been shown the use of military units became progressively more
efficient since the 1929 Massacres. In the 1933 Revolt after the Dowbiggin Report, military units
were always on the standby should the Palestine Police find themselves in a position that they
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could not handle. Even during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 military units had a policeman
embedded with them to act as a liaison and a guide. Raymond Cafferata provides a good
example of this relationship. After his long career in Palestine he had grown close to many of the
military personnel in the region. Upon his departure from the Holy Land, Major General L.G.
Whistler wrote to Cafferata:
At this time, when your work in Palestine is completed and the stay of 3rd British
Infantry Division in North Palestine is nearing its end, I should like to take the
opportunity of thank you for the very able and loyal support you and your police
forces have given me and my soldiers in the carrying out of our many combined
tasks.”292
Despite the close relationship that had been forged over the previous fifteen years, by
1946 this relationship had been discontinued after the war. There was a kind of ‘changing
of the guard’ from the wartime military occupants. As Horne describes the situation from
his time, “soldiers fresh from the Italian or European fronts—seasoned airborne soldiers
and desert rats—all thought they knew best and that Jewish terrorists were just another
enemy. Very few soldiers ever showed interest in advice from the police nor was such
advice encouraged.”293 The military’s inability to fully grasp the nuance and deep history
that rooted the Jewish terrorist groups was to everyone’s detriment as the Mandate only
became a more dangerous place to inhabit.
The already complex nature of Jewish nationalism became even more complicated as
disparate groups began to work together. The Palestine Post reported the situation in July 1946
and claimed that the Haganah and its associated force of Palmach were working under the
political control of prominent members of the Jewish Agency. They went on to claim that the
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two had been engaging in carefully planned movements of sabotage and violence under the name
of the “Jewish Resistance Movement.” Traditionally, these two forces were more legitimate
military forces working toward the protection of the Jewish population. They were not an
organization known for sabotage or assassination. It was the Irgun and Stern Gang who were
normally associated with terrorist and sabotage activity. The Post went on to claim that the Irgun
and the Stern Gang had worked since the last autumn in cooperation with Haganah’s high
command on certain of these operations. Further, the broadcasting station, Kol Israel, which
claimed to be the ‘voice of the resistance movement,’ was working under the general direction of
the Jewish Agency, and had been supporting these organization.294 In response, the Jewish
Agency denied these charges in a July 26, 1946 report to the Palestine Post.295
As far as the competing identities within both the Jewish and Arab communities, former
Constable, Roy Leadbeater thought that no matter what was being done by the Irgun or the
Hagana, there were still those within the community who did not necessarily agree. In an oral
interview he recounted the story of a crowd overrunning a Palestine Police officer: “This was a
Jewish mob. And a Jew ran out and stood over the Englishman and said, ‘Anybody tries to injure
this man, I’ll kill him.’ And saved his life. Because not all Jews agreed with the Irgun or the
Haganah…”296 However, Leadbeater claimed that he understood the motivations of the Irgun
and to a certain extent had sympathy for what they were going through. As Leadbeater
recounted:
We had sympathy for the Jews, at least I did. And I’m sure of my fellows did and
certainly some of the army that had actually, I think it was the British Seventh
Armored that was first into one of the concentration camps. And then they were
294
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posted to Palestine and they had to ship…when these illegal immigrants, Jews,
came in Britain was trying to keep the quota down because Arabs were getting
upset. And they put them on ships and took them to Cyprus.”297

Despite this understanding and measured sympathy, Leadbeater reminds us that in the
end most the police really did hate the Irgun and the Stern Gang, but certainly didn’t want
to hurt all Jews. Speaking of facing Jewish ‘mobs’ Leadbeater said: “You were there
facing people that you don’t want to hurt because you know they’ve been hurt so many
times before.”298 This is certainly something to consider in the post-World War Two era.
The handling of the problem of Jewish terrorism was incredibly delicate when
considering the events of the Holocaust.299
The papers of Constable John Poole allow us to see the kind of crime that was occurring
during the period. Having served from 1943 until the end of the mandate in 1948 Pool retained a
number of daily crime reports. These reports show everything from petty crimes to major
terrorist attacks. What is most striking about these reports was the consistent nature of attacks
against British personnel. Most of the time these attacks were small, usually carried out by a
handful of men, but always with deadly purpose in mind. The attacks most often attempted were
long range sniping and bombings. These are, in some ways, the most troubling methods of
terrorism; they are unseen and nearly impossible to anticipate or prevent.300 Raymond Cafferata
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illustrates this point in a letter written to Chief Secretary J.V.W. Shaw. Following the failed
attempt to chase down a group of terrorists in Haifa on 20th January 1946 Cafferata explained:
I am very much afraid that our chances of getting any of those responsible
finished on the spot. In these sort of shows unless one has the luck to kill the
attackers, then the chances are 100 to 1 against ever getting hold of them. It was a
very carefully planned show and having avoided the main ambush a military truck
was standing concealed in a turning further down the road to finish the job. Had it
not been for this truck we should have been able to get at them and really smarten
them up.301

The Palestine Police had been combating these kinds of terrorist activity for years, the
difference was that now the frequency of attacks and sabotage was beginning to climb at
a rapid pace. As has been the case so many times before, the perceived solution was to
call in experts and attempt to implement reform.
The man charged with this task was Lt. Col. Sir Charles Wickham who was brought in to
assess the situation in Palestine.302 Wickham was able to produce his report in a quick four
months, starting on August 1st 1946 and ending on December 2nd. Horne concludes that the
results of the report while not ‘unhealthy, or undesirable’ but were “at variance with police
experience in Palestine.”303 One aspect that Wickham’s report pointed to was the ‘militarisation
of the police’. This is an aspect that has been brought up many times throughout this study and
Wickham’s conclusion is consistent with the opinion of many policemen going back to Douglas
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Duff in 1922. Although he was the Inspector General of a militarized police force for forty-seven
years Wickham wrote,
Police are civilians and are extremely jealous of their civilian status. They resent a
military atmosphere, military discipline or being turned into military units where
their efficiency inevitably must be judged as soldiers and not as police. They
joined to do police duty and not to be soldiers.304

Horne goes on to tell us that Wickham and his assistant Moffat also found misplaced fault with
the CID in failing to gain intelligence from the Jewish community. Horne argues that the report
fails to recognize the difficulty in gathering useful intelligence from a hostile and uncooperative
community that had been alienated by the British Government. He largely dismisses the report
and claims that it was ‘quietly forgotten.’305
Despite the seemingly worthless assessment given by Wickham, the training of men
during this period seems to have adequately prepared them for what they would face in the line
of duty. Roy Leadbeater, who joined the force in 1946, described the training process as being
very focused on the prevention and detection of crime. The training consisted of 12 weeks of
drill, weapons training, and instruction on law and order. Leadbeater described the latter aspect
as “just as though we were in England.”306 This included instruction on how to present oneself in
court, how to properly assess and take notes on a crime. Another aspect that endured was a heavy
emphasis on learning Arabic and/or Hebrew. One part of Leadbeater’s training that has not
appeared in previous iterations is the instruction on the ‘extreme groups’ on the Arab side and
the Irgun, Hagana and the Stern Gang on the Jewish side.307 He goes further to reveal that the
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training process helped to discern and discourage political leaning, noting that, “If they thought
you had been pro-Arab or pro-Jewish, and especially if you were involved with a girlfriend, then
you could be sent home.”308 Once training was complete it is clear that there were still protocols
that had endured for years. One of these was the way that the Palestine Police handled mobs of
potentially dangerous people. According to Leadbeater
The drill was, the officer would stand up and he would say in Hebrew, Arabic,
and English: “I order you to disperse immediately and quietly. If you don’t, we
open fire upon you.” But we were instructed when we heard that you never fire
until you’d heard the end of the word “fire.” Because the officer would then say,
“At the knees of the crowd.” But we never got to that state and I was never in that
situation, but I knew the drill.309

Although Leadbeater himself was never forced to fire into a crowd he did recall that these
incidents were not without danger. While the police were in their firing line and the crowd was
dispersing, there would often be those up on rooftops ‘loosening rocks off the building’ to drop
on them. Another tactic that was employed was putting women and children at the front of the
crowd to prevent the police from firing into it. Luckily for Leadbeater the incidents in which he
was involved never came to shots being fired.310
Looking to improve the situation without using the Wickham report, Gray sought to reinvent
a practice from the Arab Rebellion. During the Rebellion, ‘seek and search’ missions were used
to gather information and undermine Arab plots. Gray thought that similar tactics could be used
to thwart Jewish terrorists. Under Brigadier E.B. Fergusson, who was named Assistant Inspector
General of Police in early 1947, a plan was formulated to increase the effectiveness of such
missions. Upon Fergusson’s request the British Government sent a number of ex-commando and
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Special Air Service men to join the Palestine Police.311 These men were quickly given command
of squads where they were to disappear into the Jewish communities posing as local Jews in
order to flush out terrorists. This practice of using police as special forces operators is fraught
with risk. Special Forces generally work under more legally ‘gray’ conditions whereas these
Palestine Police units had to continue to adhere to the law. This sentiment was illustrated by the
“Rubowitz Affair’. To explain, Alexander Rubowitz was a suspected terrorist in one of these
Jewish communities. After his disappearance, Roy Farran, a member of one of the specialized
units, was accused of his murder. He was brought before a Military Court and acquitted to the
dissatisfaction of the Jewish community.
According to Farran he went to Palestine at the behest of the Military Secretary and thought
“there was a good chance that [he] might be able to do something to smash those “thugs” who
murdered innocent people for doubtful political ends.”312 Upon arrival he was briefed and given
the parameters of his duty:
We were to advise on defence against terror and to take an active part in hunting
the dissidents. We would each select ten volunteers from our districts—mine were
to be Tel Aviv and Jerusalem—and train them for a fortnight in our methods. It
was to all intents and purposes a carte blanche and the original conception of our
part filled me with excitement. A free hand for us against terror when all other
were so closely hobbled!”313
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Farran claims that his group was making real progress until the ‘Rubovitz Case’.
According to Farran, the Palestine Post began to publish frequent articles relating to an
abducted youth and a hat that had been found at the scene of the abduction, which had a
name that appeared to be similar to Farran’s. He writes, “It did not matter that I could
prove that at that moment I was disguised as an Arab, having dinner with Arabs in
another part of Jerusalem called Givat Shaul. There was no evidence, but the ugly finger
of suspicion was pointed at me.”314Still, due to the appearance of impropriety and
potential for disaster, these squads were immediately disbanded.315 However, this again
demonstrates how attempting to use military units, especially those who have not
undergone sufficient training, as police was a dangerous practice.
For as much trouble as these squads caused they did little to curb the danger posed by
Jewish terrorists. If anything attacks only increased throughout 1947. The police and government
officials were under attack nearly every day. So great was the danger that even the families of
policemen and government officials were no longer safe.316 With this in mind on January 31st
1947, ‘Operation Polly’ was carried out. This was an operation to evacuate all non-combatant
civilian residents in Palestine. The Palestine Post reported on the first of the evacuees on
February 3, 1947: “The first British evacuees left Palestine by air yesterday. They were 43 wives
and children of British officials of the Consolidated Refineries of Haifa, and the wife of a
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member of the Haifa staff of the Shell Company.”317Over five hundred women and children were
first moved to barracks and then transported to Egypt on February 5th. Following Operation Polly
was ‘Operation Cantonment’ which moved all British personnel into ‘safe areas’. The Palestine
Police began to take on more escort duty and their patrols were always done in armored car.318
These actions served to completely reverse the improvements in police practice that had been
made in the previous two decades. The Palestine Police were becoming less of a police force.
They and the government were losing control over the region, and everyone knew it.
On February 18th 1947 the British Government made the decision that the problem of the
Mandate would be turned over to the United Nations. With this announcement the United
Nations Special Commission on Palestine was assembled to assess the situation in the Mandate.
The conference took place on Tuesday 24 June 1947, eight days after the arrival of the
Committee in Palestine. The UNO Committee was represented by the Chairman, Mr.
E.Sandstorm, Dr. Victor Hoo, and Dr. Ralph Bunche. The first order of business was to try and
understand the motivation of the Irgun. The Commander of the Irgun clearly laid out five points
of contention held against the British,

1. Israel is the homeland of the Jews
2. They want both E. and W. of the Jordan.
3. Immediate repatriation of all Jews wishing to be repatriated to Palestine
4. They reject the Labour Party’s assertion that Arabs would be expelled. There is
enough room in Palestine for all
5. They must meet Britain’s force with force.319
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The Irgun seemed to think that it was the British were the real instigator of discontent between
the Arabs and Jews. According to the Commander, if the British were to leave then there would
be peace and if the Jews were to be attacked then they were, in his opinion capable of protecting
themselves. He was asked what might happen to Arab land holdings in a Jewish state of
Palestine. He replied that land now held by Arabs would be retained by them, but that in the New
Palestine there would be need for agrarian reform. As in ancient times latifundia existed in
Palestine. There are vast lands held by Arab feudal landlords which are never worked, and large
tracts held by the British. The government of the new Palestine would have to adjust this
situation. Every Arab and every Jewish farmer would have to be assured of enough land for a
prosperous self-supporting farm. 320 Yet, the most succinct estimation made by the Commander
was as follows, “We are convinced that we must fight or the Jewish people will be destroyed.”321
It was on December 11th of that year that the Palestine Police received word that they
would be evacuated by May 15th 1948. This announcement meant a great deal of uncertainty for
the members of the security force. Within a matter of months they would be without a job. Yet
before they could worry about future employment, they had to ensure that they made it out of
Palestine alive, something that was anything but certain. Arabs began to pour over the border
from Syria in the hopes of pushing the Jews out of the territory. For a time the Trans-Jordan
Frontier Force was able to halt an Arab advance, but by early January 1948 the force had been
disbanded and thus the Jewish Haganna knew that they had to mobilize forces to fight against the
Arabs. The security and military forces within Palestine were put in an impossible position at this
point. In much the same way that Lord Mountbatten had decided to pragmatically draw dividing
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lines in India and leave, British forces in Palestine were inclined to allow the Jews and Arabs to
fight one another lest they be pulled into a quagmire of a conflict.
To avoid even the appearance of partiality as the withdrawal began, policemen were
ordered to burn sensitive files so either side could not access the valuable intelligence on one
another. They were ordered to drive all the armored cars over a cliff and set them ablaze. The
plan called for the force to evacuate north toward Haifa. By this point violence between Arab
irregulars and Jews was fairly widespread. Still, the British forces tried to stay out of it:
On the whole the British remained aloof, it being the government aim to keep the
roads open for evacuation purposes. The army Brigadiers had written orders not
to interfere unless the roadways were actually threatened. The moment such a
threat existed the security forces turned out to extricate Jews mostly from and
Arab ambush, although sometimes it was the other way round…Britain saw no
reason to interfere in a war between the Children of Israel and Ishmael.322

As each police station along the evacuation route was abandoned, Arabs and Jews fought for
control over it. The last of these was the depot area of Mount Scopus where it all began and so
many policemen had been trained. Just before departure, Assistant Superintendent Buck Reeves
saw a brass memorial plaque of Lt. Col. Bramley, the founder and first commander of the force,
screwed to a wall. Unwilling to let such an item be left to disgrace he took precious moments to
unscrew the plaque and years later gifted it to Bramley’s daughter. Few left Palestine with a
smile upon their face. It had been their home. For some, Palestine was more home than anywhere
else. Horne himself mused about the moment:
Yet the Jewish Rebellion, for that is what it all came to in the end, had a
curious twist, because it was lost by the British, simply because they did
not possess the will to win. In a sense everyone lost. The Arabs, because
with the British withdrawal they lost their country. Land, houses and way
of life, all of which was simply taken away. The British because they were
322
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out generalled by the ruthlessness of the terrorists, who were in the end
actively supported and even applauded by lost Jews in Palestine and
elsewhere. Finally although Israel was born, a long cherished dream of the
Jewish world, Jews lost too; because their new state arrived in a sea of
violence amid considerable moral doubt as to her respectability.323

Although this was the end of Britain in Palestine, it certainly was not the end of policing the
Empire. The British Empire was in need of skilled policemen, especially in Africa. Nearly 1,300
of the Palestine Police continued their colonial policing careers elsewhere in the empire.324
According to Binsley, those with over ten years’ service were entitled to a pension provided they
were of adequate rank. Binsley himself, “was offered a choice of awaiting a further appointment,
taking a full pension or taking a three quarter pension with the remaining quarter calculated for a
period of ten years to be paid as a lump sum.”325 Not being able to anticipate the pressing need
for police that followed quickly in Kenya and Malaya he opted for the full pension. The greatest
number, some four-hundred-fifty of these men, traveled to Malaya to help quell the Malayan
rebellion. Another rebellion, the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, created work for nearly 200 exPalestine Policemen. Other countries that saw the adoption of former members were Hong Kong,
Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Eritrea, Cyprus, the Canal Zone in Egypt, the Aden Protectorate, and a
number of assorted countries throughout Africa. However, the largest employer of former
Palestine Policemen was the Iraq Petroleum Company who were happy to hire security
professionals who spoke the language and were familiar with the Middle East.326
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Despite the various directions that men took after the Palestine Police, many were left
with a sense that the world had forgotten their efforts, or worse yet, never even knew about them
in the first place. As Leadbeater recounts,
I bought a first class ticket and I sat in the carriage in my uniform and this businessman
looked at me…He said, “That’s an odd uniform you’re wearing.” I said, “Yes, it’s the
Palestine Police.” He said, “Never heard of them.” I thought, gee…riding in the first class
carriage with whom I assume is an intelligent businessman and he doesn’t know where
Palestine is.327

Regardless of how they began their careers or where they went after, Palestine was no longer
theirs to police.
...
With the declaration of war on Germany, the Palestine Police faced an entirely new set of
problems than any they had faced previously. Jewish paramilitary units and defense
organizations grew more violent and forced the police to try and adapt. Groups such as the Stern
Gang and the Irgun quickly became the greatest threat to British personnel in the Mandate.
Further, the Arab population, though loyal to the British, were always an enticing target for
German propaganda. In addition to all of this the police had to deal with the unprecedented event
of being conscripted into military service.
Following the war the situation grew even more untenable. Jewish terrorists grew bolder
and attacks on British personnel in the Mandate increased. The greatest target of violence was no
longer the Jewish or Arab population, but the British. It quickly became clear that there was no
saving the Mandate, at least not for the British. Plans were drawn for the evacuation of Great
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Britain and by the summer of 1948 all of the Empire’s agents had been recalled. This chapter has
argued that the rise of Jewish nationalist groups along with the events of the World War Two
created a situation in Palestine that the police could only combat, but not control. Despite the
changes in training and increased understanding of terrorist groups, the tide of nationalist
sentiment and violence in the Mandate proved too much for the Palestine Police and the British
Empire to weather.
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Conclusion
Ultimately, colonial policing in both Ireland and Palestine can only be seen as a failure.
There are a multitude of factors that led to the British Empire’s exit from both theatres, many of
which have been explained here. Still, the RIC, the Black and Tans, the Auxiliaries, the British
Gendarmerie, and the Palestine Police were, in the end, unable to subdue largely uncooperative
populations. The forces of nationalism and religion proved too great.
Yet out of this failure we are able to see an evolution of training and tactics out of the
desire to make peace and maintain to the imperial status quo. The events of the Anglo-Irish War
and the tactics often used by the security forces were without question, brutal. But these were
military men who knew little more than war. They were not prepared or adequately trained to be
policemen. When they came under attack from Irish nationalists they resorted more to their
military training than to their police training; when the enemy attacked, they counterattacked.
This certainly does not excuse the actions taken by the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries, but it
does help to explain contributing factors to the bloodshed.
When the security forces of Ireland moved into the Palestine Mandate to form the British
Gendarmerie, their training was little better than what they had received previously. However,
they had several years of experience at that point and perhaps more importantly, were initially
faced with a less hostile population to police. The Arabs and Jews of the Mandate did not seek
and destroy constables in the same way that the IRA had. With this new environment, the violent
streak of the Black and Tans did not manifest itself. What followed was the most peaceful years
of the Palestine Mandate.
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The halcyon days of the mid to late 1920s meant that the training of security forces, for
the most part, did not need to be revised. It was only after the 1929 Massacres that the glaring
inadequacies of the Palestine Police were shown. The following decade saw a continuous cycle
of riot and reform whereby the force was made much more effective and efficient. The training
and tactics of the police now prepared constables to communicate with the population they
policed and allowed them to resolve many situations peacefully.
The Arab Revolt 1936-1939 saw the rise of both Arab and Jewish terrorism. It was at this
point that the seeds of the Palestine Police’s failure were sown. With the aid of the military and
the force’s evolved tactics, the Palestine Police were able to maintain relative control of the
Mandate until the beginning of the Second World War. It was at this point that Arab terrorism
dissipated and Jewish terrorism grew. Throughout the war and during its aftermath the force tried
to combat an unending barrage of attacks on Arab, Jewish, British non-combatants. The Jewish
nationalists made it clear that they saw the British as an unwelcome occupying force. The
Palestine Police wrestled for years with a question that we have yet to answer; how does one
police terror? They were unable to answer this question and again, the forces of nationalism
forced the British out. As it has already been said, the efforts of British Colonial policing in
Ireland and Palestine were ultimately a failure. There were countless successes along the path to
that failure, but in the end they were simply not enough. The rising tide of nationalism consumed
these countries. Perhaps Douglas Duff said it best in reflecting upon his time after having left
Palestine: “The pity of it all…each has so much of right and of justice on his side—and yet each
has marred his cause by so deep a blot of black, bitter injustice and of bloodstained
intolerance.328
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